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Translations From MILITAER WESEN (44)



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PARTY ORGANIZATIONS PLAY KEY ROLE IN NVA

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German May 75 pp 3-12

[Editorial by Col Gen H. Scheibe, candidate member of the SED Central Committee and head of the department for security questions of the SED Central Committee]

Text Thanks to the diligent and creative efforts of the working class and of all working people we have made good progress under the leadership of our Marxist-Leninist party since the Eighth SED Party Congress. Justifiedly and proudly we can state today that the GDR has been further consolidated and developed as a socialist state. We are closer than ever allied with the Soviet Union and with the other countries of the socialist community of states.

Our republic has attained worldwide esteem, has been recognized under international law, and makes an active contribution to the safeguarding of peace in Europe and to the solution of other international problems resulting from the targets of coordinated socialist foreign policy. The 13th session of the SED Central Committee has established as an important result of the party's activity that the policies of the Eighth Party Congress, which are based on the interests of the working class and the working people and are aimed at the welfare of the people, have led to a noticeable improvement of the material cultural standard of living of our people. This has led to a further strengthening of trust in the policies of the party and of the power of socialism.

Constantly High Combat Readiness as a Central Task, Goal and Standard of Party Work

The initiatives and activities of our working people and army members displayed after the 13th session of the Central Committee in all areas of

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society confirm the great understanding and increasing readiness for doing everything to attain the extensive, demanding, and realistic goals of the Five-Year Plan.

The all-round and successful development of our republic and the deepening of our fraternal alliance with the Soviet Union consolidate and also perfect the foundations of national defense. This fact makes it possible for our party and our socialist state, in accordance with the objective requirements of the military system and our capabilities, to give to the National People's Army [NVA] everything it needs in order to fulfill its responsible tasks reliably at any time on the side of the glorious Soviet Army and of the other fraternal socialist armies.

Based on a comprehension of the interrelationship of politics, economics, and national defense, on results and tasks of domestic and foreign policies, on the status of social development of the GDR, and on the increased maturity of our people, the NVA members have an increasingly better understanding of the truly great demands on class vigilance and defense readiness and fulfill their internationalist responsibility and duty resulting therefrom. The NVA members know very well that they are making a concrete contribution by means of a further increase of the combat readiness and battle strength of the battalions, regiments, and divisions in order to make the progressive process of detente irreversible, a process which was initiated by the peace program of the 24th CPSU Party Congress.

Together with their Soviet brothers-in-arms and the other socialist armies allied in the Warsaw Pact they are prepared for any abrupt change in the international situation and will do everything in order to provide in the future as well, favorable external conditions for further progress and successes of socialism. High combat readiness is and remains therefore the central task, goal, and standard of the effectiveness of party work within the NVA. Knowledge of the effects of socialist military power and experience gathered in the class struggle induce the battalions, regiments, divisions, service areas, institutions, and installations of the NVA to make maximum efforts to keep combat readiness and battle strength on the requisite level.

It is primarily due to the great party collective of the NVA, to the members of all the component forces of the NVA, and the frontier troops of the GDR that the NVA was able to reliably protect the frontiers, air space, and advanced coastal areas and that it was armed against any type of surprise. Life proves always more enduringly and impressively that the successful implementation of the main tasks of the Eighth Party Congress is predicated upon the leading role of the party and the strengthening of its influence on all aspects of social life.

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Influence of the Basic Organization on all Aspects of Military Life

Our party substantiated completely at the Eighth Party Congress why its leading role in the further shaping of the developed socialist society is increasing. The 13th session of the Central Committee again directs our attention to the fact that the solution of every new task requires the creative intellectual participation and action of all the people. This is the case because, in step with the development consciousness and activity, there also occurs an increase in the requirements for knowledge of interrelationships for the practical accomplishment of tasks and the necessity for all-round coordination in the management of social processes. In the final analysis, our people themselves are growing in this respect. On the one hand this creates favorable conditions for the accomplishment of the tasks ahead of us and on the other hand this places new and higher demands on party work. The objective law of the growth of the leading role of the party in socialist society also applies fully to party work in the NVA. The effectiveness of this objective law within the socialist armed forces results also from the status and development of the military system, the character of modern war, the development of the international situation, and the demands on class vigilance and combat readiness derived therefrom.

The basic party organizations and the exemplary behavior of its members and candidate members play a decisive role in the implementation of the policies of the party in the NVA.

The inspiring, guiding, and forward-moving power of our combat alliance is above all reflected in their activities, operations, and appearance.

The basic organizations are the firm foundation of our party, because they are theoretically, politico-ideologically, and organizationally capable of implementing the political line and the strategy and tactics of the party. The members and candidate members are being trained and qualified in the basic organizations to perform aggressive political work among army members, work which meets the requirements of the class struggle.

The basic organizations have to solve manifold tasks. Today they must assess, answer, or decide within their areas questions and problems which range from the concrete problems of education and training to the wide interrelationships of the world revolutionary process. As was stated by the First Secretary of the SED Central Committee, Comrade Erich Honecker, they comprise the complete range of politics, economics, ideology, and national defense.

Basically, what is involved is that the party organizations have to guide the implementation of tasks within their spheres of responsibility in a political and ideological manner. Based on the increased consciousness

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and the experience of members and candidate members, it is now mainly a matter of attaining a higher quality of party work and of shaping this work in such a manner that it can bring about positive changes in all aspects of military life.

Exemplariness of Members and Candidate Members in the Military Collectives

Party work is primarily concrete work. It is measured by the practical military and political results in education and training and the clarification of problems presently on the agenda. Party work must give answers to questions posed by life. It is up to the comrades, for example, to explain why today the question of intensification and increase of effectiveness in our national economy is being posed with a completely new emphasis and why we are concentrating our efforts on acceleration of scientific and technical progress, on the national economy, on an increase in work efficiency, rational use and increase of effectiveness of social work capacities, and on deepening of socialist economic integration, and why no reductions can be made in class vigilance and combat readiness, and to explain the consequences resulting therefrom for the daily actions of the army members.

The party members are expected not only to explain party policies but also to set an example, mainly within their work collectives and military combat collectives, for strong initiative and mobilizing action in the implementation of party decision. They gain respect, authority, and influence and perform effective work in the achievement of the leading role of the party in the NVA by their exemplary behavior in political and military training, their class-oriented viewpoint on current political and military events, and by their untiring detail work in the combat collectives for the purpose of attaining outstanding results in socialist competition and in the strengthening of discipline and order.

It is now being demanded of a communist that he acts in complicated and tense situations according to the principle of always being the first, of leading, and of taking and successfully solving the most difficult assignments.

To Mobilize Army Members for Action Rich in Initiative

If the politico-ideological work of the party organizations is conducted for the purpose of changing people and developing them into socialist personalities, who excel by their unshakable class viewpoint and exemplary efforts for the strengthening and defense of socialism, who act in the spirit of proletarian internationalism, and who work proudly and modestly, then this work is up to the level of its tasks. This presupposes a close relationship of trust with all army members. This makes it necessary over and over again to fathom the essence of party decisions, to understand

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policy not only in its totality but also in its separate battle sectors, to comprehend the interrelationships and complexity of the strategy and tactics of the party in the class conflict and to deduce direct tasks and conclusions for the respective area of responsibility.

Purposeful politico-ideological work, which is closely related to life, accounts for the main content of party work. It is the key for any progress in the fulfillment and military tasks, for cadre education, consolidation of aware discipline and order, further improvement of service and living conditions, and development of truly socialist relations in the military combat collectives.

Politically Demanding and Vivacious Membership Meetings

Politically demanding and vivacious membership meetings of the basic organizations are of greatest importance for qualifying and educating members and candidate members for effective work among army members. They must see to it that the policies and decisions of the party on the basic problems of our socialist development methods and the class conflict with imperialism are being explained convincingly and understandably to everyone. It is especially important to point out the politico-ideological, economic, military, and also personal problems connected with military processes, the requirements of training programs, directives, service regulations, and orders, to draw the respective conclusions, and to take decisions which can be accounted for in a concrete manner.

The leaderships of the party organizations should pay greater attention to the demand that the membership meetings and party work in general should always give priority to problems connected with the unfolding of activity and initiative in the struggle for high combat readiness and battle strength.

In this connection there constantly arise new problems within the sphere of responsibility of the basic organizations. This is a result, among other things, of the dialectics and complexity of our socialist development work, the conflict between socialism and imperialism, and the requirements and tasks derived therefrom at present for our armed forces. For example, in the implementation of our policy of peaceful coexistence, the class fronts and the class enemy are not always immediately recognizable for young party members and especially for young army members. It is sometimes difficult for these young people to recognize the connection between the struggle for peaceful coexistence, strengthening of the military power of socialism, and the struggle against the imperialist system and to draw conclusions from this for their own work. It is therefore quite natural that the basic organizations are constantly faced with new tasks and that the number as well as concreteness of questions and the demands of army members for convincing arguments and answers are on the increase. They are a reflection of the growing identification with the affairs of the party, the working class, and socialism and express an increasing sense of responsibility

of the army members for the decisions of the Eighth SED Party Congress and for the tasks assigned by this congress to the NVA.

Conduct of Political Dialogue as an Important Party Task for Every Comrade

In this view, the problems posed by the daily political and military life before the basic organization are a requirement and summons to give greater play in party work to the formation of collective opinion and to thorough and frank discussion. The requirement for party work to answer all questions posed by life in a concrete and differentiated manner and to lead army members into action is tied in with the elementary duty of a comrade to conduct a personal political dialogue day in and day out and to establish a close and trusting contact with the army members.

It is one of the most important party assignments for every comrade to conduct the political dialogue in a qualified and constant manner. This makes it possible to explain the party line quickly and effectively to all army members and at the same time to catch on to their thoughts, problems, and proposals and to use them in further work.

The political dialogue is for the large majority of members and candidate members a real need. They feel satisfaction and joy and sense the growing responsibility and readiness of our army members to master complex military tasks. But it is apparent too that not all take this important party assignment serious. But whoever does not conduct the political dialogue, is inactive and contributes insufficiently to an increase in the quality of party work. The political dialogue is and remains a touchstone for the capacity and readiness of a communist to act in the spirit of the decisions and to act in conformity with the demand of the Eighth Party Congress:

Where there is a comrade there is the party.

To Perfect the Quality of Intraparty Life

We need a higher quality of intraparty life in order to meet the growing demands placed on party work. A decisive role in this is being played by an open atmosphere in which everything which is important for the strengthening of the respective collective is being articulated without hesitation and diplomacy.

The experience of the best party organizations teaches that such an atmosphere is being attained where:

--the party leaderships and party organizations are sufficiently aware of the increased awareness, education, and experience of army members and come to the respective conclusions;

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--in party organizations which develop collectivity, establish personal responsibility, and demand and promote honest and objective criticism and self-criticism, in short, where democratic centralism and intraparty democracy contribute to extensive and thorough discussion and where the entire party collective stands squarely behind a decision of a basic organization and fights for its implementation, once a unity of will has been established;

--the interrelationships of the party members are shaped by mutual respect and trust, comradeship, and mutual assistance. The comrades must have the feeling that they belong to a battle alliance of like-minded persons, that their word is of importance, and that their opinions are being sought, respected, and used;

--there exists a uniform party discipline, which applies without distinction of person, service rank, function, and merits and which is based on the statute of our party and where the methods of party education are being used meaningfully and in an educationally effective manner;

--the party organization applies its influence to all aspects of military life, does not bypass shortcomings, and quickly makes the experience of the best available to all.

A higher quality of intraparty life also means that the party organizations use more than ever the rights and obligations established in the party statute and the instruction for the party organizations in the NVA.

Demands Made on the Leadership Activity of the Leading Polit and Party Organs

The growing demands made on the maturity and battle strength of the party members and party organizations in the NVA result also in new requirements on the leadership activity of the leading polit and party organs vis-a-vis the basic organizations. What matters now especially in their work is to move, in a meaningful and concentrated form, those problems into the center of guidance and continued education, which are theoretically, ideologically, and also practically of decisive importance for the work of the party organizations. Such a guidance must take place in a differentiated, specific, and relevant manner and must also be time-saving and effective. The 13th session of the SED Central Committee establishes many current criteria, which are helping us to assess the real condition of the leadership activity of the party leaderships and political and party organs in a thorough and critical manner and to draw the necessary conclusions vis-a-vis routine, superficiality, and lack of concreteness in party work.

The effectiveness of party work is closely related to the further achievement of the Leninist style of party work. It demands unreserved openness

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and exact knowledge and information about the politico-ideological positions, moods, and opinions of the army members regarding the politics and military policies of the party and the problems of military life. More than ever will we need exact and substantiated analyses of the situation and the recognition of priority areas and new developments, as well as a decisive struggle against shortcomings and obstacles in the work. Only such a procedure will make it possible to draw concrete and specific conclusions for leadership activity with respect to effective and vivacious political work and to establish suitable measures of party organization. This makes it possible at the same time to make decisions at the right time with respect to the correct questions, problems, and materials, to bring available forces and means into play economically and effectively, and to organize on-the-spot guidance and assistance. Experience teaches that quality and effectiveness of the work of the leading political and party organs are decisively influenced by the degree in which they succeed in providing continued education in Marxism-Leninism to the full-time and volunteer party functionaries in the party organizations, in developing their organizational talent and their ability to work with people, and in perfecting their moral and character traits. They must be taught to assess social phenomena in a class-related manner from the positions of our Marxist-Leninist Weltanschauung, to defend the principles of proletarian internationalism and socialist patriotism, and to aggressively unmask bourgeois and revisionist views.

In this connection, increased support must be given to the party functionaries to determine the most suitable and effective methods of party work, to organize their work on the basis of the decisions, to include everybody by way of concrete party assignments, and to implement the duty of accountability consistently. This means they have to be enabled to shape the unity of ideological and organization work constantly more efficiently. More attention has to be paid in indoctrinations, seminars, and consultations to independent preparation of convincing arguments and creative and constructive debate on the best experience with organizational policies. The organized and purposeful exchange of experience gains constantly in importance. This is the case because the systematic generalization of the best experience is an important reserve for increasing the effectiveness of political and military work. Mutual assistance and comradely collaboration are, as is known, according to V. I. Lenin, the basic principle of socialist learning and work and an advantage of our socialist society.

Exchange of Experience as a central Element of Leadership Activity

Viewed from these aspects, the consciously conducted high-quality exchange of experience is a central point of leadership and guidance activity. This fact is being strengthened, because the "Military Assignment 75," conducted within the socialist competition, goes beyond the limits of the battalions and regiments and is being conducted primarily with our Soviet class brothers and comrades-in-arms.

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All this forces upon us new considerations and a clear battle position on the party organizations. The more convincing and energetically the party organizations struggle for this clear battle position, decrease ideological prejudices and reservations, lead by providing good examples, and influence party education, the more openly and aware will army members, battle collectives, and military leaderships approach the evaluation of everything which is new and progressive and make assessments and decisions, which will be binding for the further development of the education and training process and for a higher combat readiness.

Very simply, more must be done to introduce and implement proven experience into practice instead of just talking about this experience and its necessity and application. The manner in which the best experience is being applied with provable advantage and lasting success is always decisive.

Higher quality of party work also means that the best experience must be studied, assimilated, and immediately and unbureaucratically made into a general asset. A differentiated exchange of ideas and experience, covering also the "how" of party work, is a genuine need of party workers, which must be taken into account increasingly by the polit and party organs. Higher quality of party work requires that the party organizations receive on time the information required by them to solve their responsible tasks and that their critical suggestions and proposals are being considered more carefully.

Party information as an effective means for qualified management of party work must above all be open and honest and must be provided from the top down and from the bottom up. It must report on positive and negative experience and decisions, provide a complete overview over the situation, and be shaped by all party members efficiently and in a worthwhile manner. It is not a matter of more written reports and more paper, as is still often the case, but one of on-the-spot vivacious and direct practical work.

The growing requirements placed on the party as a whole and on every communist make it necessary to carry out politico-ideological and organizational activities on a high level, to perfect intraparty life, to raise the political maturity and the aware and disciplined activity of members and candidate members, and to increase their influence in the work- and military battle collectives, as well as in the mass organizations. All aspects of party work merge into the party assignment, which consists in strengthening the struggle strength and influence of the party organizations on all aspects of military life for the purpose of meeting honorably and at any time the military tasks established by the Eighth SED Party Congress.

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FRG CDU SEEN AS THREAT TO WORLD PEACE

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German May 75 pp 48-52

[By Col Dr H. Schaedel]

/Text/ On January 9 and 10, 1975, about 400 representatives of the CDU /Christian Democratic Union/ assembled in Koblenz for a "congress on security policy." They discussed ideas for "an alternative program of military policy" under the motto "more security in freedom." However, this congress served not only the discussion of CDU military policy, but must also be assessed as an attempt to commit the social-liberal government to a more aggressive course of military policy. This interpretation is supported by the fact that active and reserve generals as well as officers of the Bundeswehr attended in addition to the CDU chairman Kohl, and the "spokesman on defense matter," Woerner, and the former minister of defense, v. Hassel; among the Bundeswehr representatives present were the chief of the staff section for military policy and command of the Federal Ministry of Defense, Rear Admiral Trebesch.

The speeches made by Kohl, v. Hassel, and Woerner at the congress and the discussion in the four work groups prove: this congress was permeated by the spirit of the cold war, which serves exclusively the forces of reaction and aggression, especially the military-industrial complex. This congress was therefore concerned with the preparation of a program of military policy of the most aggressive forces of FRG imperialism, which according to their concepts is in the spirit of the times.

Now, one cannot claim at all that the military policy of the social-democrat government corresponds to the interests of the working class and that it is directed against the most aggressive forces in the FRG. Since the SPD /Social Democratic Party of Germany/ has appointed the Federal Minister

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of Defense, the military budget of the FRG has increased from M19.5 billion to M31.6 billion. In no area is there such a wide agreement between government and opposition as in the area of armaments. It should be mentioned in this respect that the CDU's "congress on security policy" provided a cover for Leber vis-a-vis his own party, the SPD. For example, it was claimed that Leber had been able to achieve "numerous projects" against the resistance of his fraction only because of the "constructive collaboration of the CDU/CSU /Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union/."

Three basic lines stand out when one attempts to characterize this congress:

1. The search for ways to stop the process of detente and to reverse it, if possible. The congress reflects the fear of further steps of detente.
2. A rarely so openly stated endeavor to overcome the contradiction between the economic power of the FRG imperialism and its limited political and military influence and to build up its position especially in "Europe."
3. The endeavor of the most aggressive forces of FRG imperialism to regain the initiative in the "security and defense policy." They are afraid that the military policy of the more flexible forces could weaken the aggression readiness and capacity of the Bonn army over the long term.

It is noteworthy that the ideas developed at the congress approximate to a large degree those which were made originally by American politicians for the "Atlantic Charter"¹: to secure the change of the power relations in favor of imperialism through an intertwining of the political, economic, and military potentials of the imperialist states. Hermann Axen made the following statement concerning this intention at the 13th plenary session of the SED Central Committee:

"In their class conceit they are not giving up the hope to still achieve a military superiority over the Soviet Union and to be able to again change the power equations in the world in their favor."²

Incapacity of Assessing the Situation Realistically

German imperialism had already twice to suffer annihilating defeats, because it was incapable to assess the power equations realistically. The change in power equations in favor of the forces of peace, democracy, and socialism, which took place after the victory of the USSR over German fascism also in the military area, has forced FRG imperialism into a more realistic assessment of the situation, even though later than was the case with other imperialist powers. No imperialist government is at present able to deny that the policy of detente has created more favorable conditions for the safeguarding of peace and even that there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence.

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Even the CDU congress made the assessment that the situation in Europe too "has changed more decisively than ever since the invention of the atomic weapon,"³ however not in favor of security. In the view of Joerner there exists a "dangerous security gap," which finds an expression in the "expanding sense of fear, uncertainty, and cultural pessimism."⁴ Security is alleged to be further threatened by the "oil weapon," the "raw materials shortage," and the convulsions of the world economic system." The deep crisis, in which the Imperialist system finds itself at present, has apparently further decreased the ability of the aggressive forces of FRG Imperialism to assess the political development accurately. The CDU attempts to assign to the inner crumbling of Imperialism a general validity for all states and social systems. It believes that it can in this manner divert attention not only from the causes of the crisis, which rest in the nature of Imperialism, but also from the simultaneous process of the constant strengthening of socialism.

The leading powers of the CDU, however, do not stop with this. The assertion that detente was only useful to the Soviet Union is intended to discredit the policy of detente. Von Hassel did not shy away from openly stating: "The foolish, dangerous, and agitationally effective talk that peace has become more secure has caused much harm."⁵

The forces of reaction and war, however, take a stand not only against an improvement in international relations but also against the democratic forces in the NATO states. They assert that "domestic security" is being threatened by "antidemocratic" forces and the "policy of the people's front." The CDU attempts in this manner at its "congress of security policy" to disparage any kind of democratic movement. It demands in this respect stronger measures against members of the DKP /German Communist Party/ and other citizens of the FRG, who favor the cooperation of all peace forces and who openly take positions against the powers which are pressing for war. Since the aggressive forces of the FRG are unable to assess the situation realistically, but dispose over considerable political and material assets, one cannot overlook the dangers brought about by their faulty estimates.

Anti-Sovietism a Basic Folly of the DCU

A play with assigned roles was staged with respect to the relations with the socialist states. Kohl, as a possible candidate for the chancellorship, for example, was restrained in his anti-socialist remarks and characterized the "readiness for mutual understanding," including vis-a-vis the "peoples of the East," as a "pillar of the security policy." However, poorly disguising his basic anti-Soviet position, he calumniated the USSR in an article published prior to the congress and imputed to the USSR that it was seeking the "control of Europe."⁶

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On the other hand, Woerner and von Hassel agitated massively especially against the USSR with an openness which has not been the practice for a long time. There appears in this respect clear differences vis-a-vis the governmental policy of the SPD and FDP /Free Democratic Party/. The policy of detente, which was initiated by the USSR and adhered to by all the states of the Warsaw Pact, was openly put into question. There was an attempt in all the speeches to calumniate the USSR policy which is directed toward achievement of detente. For example, von Hassel claimed that it is being used "to throw sand in the eyes of the opponent."⁷ And Woerner maintains that the faulty assessment of the detente policy has led to the fact that the "politico-strategic importance of military power" was underestimated.⁸ One should not overlook their fear that political detente may be supplemented by military detente, which would lead to a limitation of the influence of the military-industrial complex.

The main thrust of the anti-communist agitation is directed against the Soviet Union, because it is the most decisive and influential protagonist for further steps of detente. As the congress has proven, the CDU welcomes any means when it believes that it can feed the anti-Soviet agitation. For example, Woerner demanded that the FRG should conduct a detente policy, which would not lead to a strengthening of the states of the Warsaw Pact, and that trade with the Soviet Union should be kept within limits.⁹

The aggressive intentions pursued with the "alternative program of military policy" becomes apparent also in the demand that the "German question should be kept open" and be used for fueling revanchism. For example the report on the consultations of the working group I (Threat-Detente-Security) states "that the German question should be open. The wish of the German people for reunification should not be considered by the Germans as a burden but rather as an element of defensive power against communism."¹⁰

West European Integration

Just like the social-liberal government coalition, the CDU too considers the alliance with the United States in the framework of NATO as "an unrenounceable basis of German security policy."¹¹ The congress pronounced the reasons for this openly. What matters above all is the nuclear shield for the program of military policy of FRG imperialism.

However, it should not be overlooked that the CDU considers the "integration" of Western Europe as the main concern of its alliance policy. It requests that the "political union of Western Europe" should take place still within this decade. The framework for this should be formed by the EEC /European Economic Community/, which should be supplemented at the same time by "West European defense cooperation." The "congress on security policy" stressed that this would strengthen the "European component of NATO."

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Additional Impulses for the military strengthening of NATO and for an increase of its combat strength through more effective utilization of available potentials are to be provided under the cover of West European integration. In this manner the members of the so-called Euro-Group were induced to spend in 1974 alone 2.5 billion dollars more for armaments than originally planned.

This is, however, only a cause for strengthened orientation toward the integration of Western Europe. The aggressive forces of FRG Imperialism want to use the deep crisis, which affects the allies of the FRG more than itself, in order to advance their hegemony plans one step further. Kohl states openly that the FRG plays "increasingly a key role" in "Europe."¹² It cannot be overlooked in this respect that the FRG imperialism has significant economic and military potentials, with which it puts pressure on its allies to disrupt the detente process not only in Europe and with which it can conjure up serious conflict situations.

Concerning Military Strategy and Armed Forces Planning

The greatest agreement between government and opposition exists in questions connected with the direct preparation of the FRG for aggressive military actions and this finds an expression in the joint approval of the defense budget. But it was impossible not to hear the CDU demand for an increase of the military potential even at the expense of the standard of living, for an increased ideological preparation of war, and for a further increase of military expenditures by all the NATO states. Woerner's demand that the working people must be ready to accept "the limitations of the standard of living"¹³ is only too closely related to Goebbels' slogan: "cannons instead of butter." Von Hassel's statement "that it would become apparent also in the budget decisions"¹⁴ when the CDU again becomes a government party, is therefore a remark the truth of which one cannot reject.

A direct effect of the aggressive course of the CDU became apparent in connection with the approval by the Bundestag on 24 January 1975 of the new armed forces structure. The system of "availability readiness" /Verfuegungsbereitschaft/ was changed by urgent request of the CDU. The originally planned reduction of the constantly available number of personnel from 495,000 men to 465,000 men did not take place. The entering into force of the availability readiness would make it possible for the leadership of the Bundeswehr to increase the forces level of the Bundeswehr much beyond 500,000 men without declaring a "state of defense urgency" /Verteidigungszustand/.

These few excerpts from the statements on military policy of the "congress on security policy" of the CDU make it clear which great efforts are being made by the most aggressive forces of imperialism in order to regain the

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offensive. However unrealistic these notions may be, they are nevertheless too dangerous to be dismissed as illusions. It requires great vigilance to defeat them and a readiness and capability to prevent their implementation.

The results of this congress make clear how correct and foresighted the following passage of the report of the 13th session of the SED Central Committee is: "We have arrived at the assessment that the tendency toward detente in world politics, especially also in European policies, represents the main tendency. In contrast thereto, trends continue to be effective, which create tensions, increase tensions, and endanger peace."¹⁵

FOOTNOTES

1. Compare A. Charisius, T. Tobias: "The 'Atlantic Declaration'--an Anti-Socialist Compromise Between the United States and the European NATO States." In: MILITAERWESEN, Berlin, No 1. 1975, pp 29 ff.
2. AUS DEN DISKUSSIONSREDEN AUF DER 13. TAGUNG DES ZK DER SED (From the Discussion Speeches at the 13th Session of the SED Central Committee), Berlin, 1974, p 77.
3. M. Woerner: Speech of the chairman of the working group on "Defense" of the CDU/CSU Bundestag fraction. Congress on Security Policy, 9-10 January 1975. KONFERENZMATERIALIEN DER CDU (Conference Materials of the CDU) O.O. u. J. expansion unknown, p 4.
4. Ibid., p 2.
5. K. U. v. Hassel: Speech of the Vice Chairman of the Bundestag. In: ibid., p 3.
6. H. Kohl: "The Security of the FRG in a Changing World With Special Consideration of the Role of China." In: SICHERHEIT HEUTE (Security Today), Bad Honnef, No 4, 1974, p 577.
7. K. U. v. Hassel: op. cit., p 5.
8. M. Woerner: op. cit., p 7.
9. Compare ibid., p 12.
10. Report of the Working Groups. In: KONFERENZMATERIALIEN...op. cit., p 6.
11. Ibid., p 6.

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12. VERTEIDIGUNGSPOLITISCHE INFORMATIONEN FUER POLITIK UND PRESSE (Information on Defense Policy for Politics and Press), Bonn, No 233, 1975, p 3.
13. M. Woerner: op. cit., p 2.
14. K. U. v. Hassel: op. cit., p 2.
15. AUS DEM BERICHT THE POLITBUEROS AN DIE 13. TAGUNG DES ZK DER SED. BERICHTERSTATTER: GENOSSE ERICH HONECKER (From the Report of the Politburo to the 13th Session of the SED Central Committee. Speaker: Comrade Erich Honecker), Berlin, 1974, p 66.

POLITICAL QUALIFICATIONS OF NCO'S EXAMINED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German May 75 pp 53-59

[By Col K. Geisler, military historian]

/Text/ At the Army NCO school Kurt Bennewitz, every effort is made to thoroughly train future NCO's in every aspect for service in the field. Part of this complete and thorough training is to make the young NCO cadres adopt a firm class point of view, to give them such applicable Marxist-Leninist, military and military-technological knowledge and know-how as to enable them to perform successfully as political and military educators, to train and lead their subordinates in battle in accordance with the requirements of the army programs. At our institute, the political-ideological and military training and qualification of NCO candidates is increasingly directed toward developing practical capabilities and know-how. Some examples are given below on how we at the NCO school Kurt Bennewitz approach the task of developing in future NCO's the ability for effective political-ideological work.

Thorough Knowledge of Those To Be Trained--a Prerequisite for Purposive and Effective Qualification

Of great importance for the work of all those who at our institute are responsible for educating and training NCO candidates (beginning with the supervision of the NCO school, including all superiors and teachers and concerning both party and FDJ organizations) are exact knowledge of, and attention to, the preparatory educational work done elsewhere (school, professional training and so forth) as well as the mood and opinions of the trainees.

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In our work of education and training, we may assume that the young NCO candidates who come to our Institute to be trained are self-confident and educated people who excel in active participation in the life of society and in good judgment. It is significant for their further education that the young NCO candidates have opted for service of limited duration in the NVA; experience has shown that in the course of their training part of these comrades decide to become professional soldiers. These decisions are essentially political decisions. And it is the task of commanding officers and political workers, of party and FDJ organizations, to strengthen the young NCO candidates in their belief that they have made the right decision, thus causing far-reaching agreement of their personal interests with those of society.

Therefore, the activity of all teaching personnel in political-ideological education and training of the young NCO cadres is centered around developing firm, socially valuable motives for later activity as NCO's in the field, around thoroughly clarifying the meaning of being a soldier and around developing and reinforcing the fundamental convictions of a socialist military personality.

In this we proceed from the fact that socialist NCO personalities are developed and reinforced through activity in their military fighting collectives. To develop those qualities and attitudes which distinguish the socialist NCO personality and enable it to fulfill military orders in an exemplary fashion is a very complex process, a process comprising and penetrating all aspects of military life. This development is accomplished in political and military training, in striving for exemplary results in socialist competition, in active work in behalf of society in party and FDJ organizations, in cultural and sports activity and in meaningful use of leisure time.

All ways and methods of political work laid down in regulations are purposefully used by us for class education. In this, it has been our experience that it makes a significant difference in the effectiveness of political work how thoroughly we know and consider the problems, moods and opinions of the young soldiers. For this reason, the political department together with the social science faculty has developed a methodology for working out what the opinions are, and evaluating them, with the following aims in view:

- a) To form a fairly concrete idea as to how the new recruits (NCO candidates and soldiers) are motivated in regard to special selected problems and what they think and know about them;
- b) As regards those who graduate from the school, to determine how effective the political-ideological education and training at the institute has been, and how far developed the attitude is toward service as an NCO, as well as the ability to perform this service;

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c) To draw correct conclusions from the results for work of political training, especially as regards selecting points of emphasis, for instance, in shaping the subject matter in social science training and in political and cultural work with the masses.

A proven method for getting to know moods and opinions is the political discussions--both individual ones and those in the collective--conducted by supervisors, agitators collectives and teachers of the social science faculty, party and FDJ officials and the instructional discussions in social science training.

The situation regarding moods and opinions is periodically discussed and evaluated in the political department. These periodic discussions and evaluations are a firm component of the working style of the political organ. The results of the evaluations form an important basis for supervising the entire political-ideological educational process, for the assignment of tasks by the leader of the political department to the leader of the social science faculty, to the commanding officers' representatives for political work and to the party secretaries of the faculties, as well as for determining points of emphasis of the analytical activity at the NCO school.

Experience has confirmed that by using knowledge regarding existing opinions as a basis one can do highly subject-oriented political-ideological educational work.

Qualification for Political Work--Not a Task for an Individual Department

To qualify NCO candidates to become superiors, without a doubt, is among the most difficult things in the education and training at the NCO school. In developing the qualifications of future NCO's for conducting political work with soldiers, we proceed from the following:

--NCO candidates can develop qualifications for practical political work only if they personally and creatively tackle the subject matter offered in social science training and the questions and problems which come to the fore in political work with the masses.

--The development of qualifications for political work must not be regarded merely as the particular task of the social science faculty, but all subjects and fields of training must participate in it; it is a component of the combined aim of all training and educational forces.

--An exemplary demeanor of teachers and all superiors is a precondition for successful political-ideological education, for developing and confirming fundamental socialist views and corresponding attitudes, as well as for effective development of qualifications of the NCO candidates. In

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their party demeanor, their social activity and their socialist leadership, teachers and superiors must set an example to the future NCO. It is, therefore, an important concern of the commanding officers and party organizations of our Institute constantly to work on the political qualification and education of educators and teachers. These efforts are centered around making sure of the exemplariness of SED members and candidate members in all of military life.

--The effectiveness of political work is very significantly affected by firm military order and discipline, tight organization of the service, reinforced socialist relations between superiors and subordinates, as well as among NCO candidates, in the military collectives and good service and living conditions.

--The entire military life at the NCO school must take on such form that the NCO candidate learns the basic forms of political-ideological work and that the political work at the institute can serve as a guide in his future work in the field. We, therefore, aim at actively enlisting all NCO candidates in the measures of political-ideological work and at insuring a high instructive-methodological content and high ideological-educational effectiveness of these measures.

Close friendly relations have existed for several years between the NCO school and a component of the Guards of the Soviet Army as well as between individual faculties and nearby Soviet units. We are utilizing these purposively for educating the NCO candidate in internationalism, and unswerving comradeship-in-arms. The cooperation proceeds on the basis of friendship treaties which are concluded anew each year. It is very multifarious and is of great mutual benefit for class education in the units. The young NCO who leaves our school at the end of the course and assumes his duties in the field has learned from personal experience to know and to value the friendly cooperation with the "regiment next door," and this valuable experience will always stand him in good stead in his political work with his subordinates in his unit. For us, too, the superiors, educators and teachers of the young NCO's, the experience of the Soviet comrades in political and military training and in increasing combat readiness is of great value in constantly improving the training process at our institute.

Social Science Training--the Main Qualification for Political Work

One of the capabilities an NCO needs to fulfill his tasks as political and military educator and trainer of a fighting collective is to be able to argue convincingly and topically concerning basic political questions. To qualify the NCO's to conduct political discussions is, therefore, an important component of their training. In their social science training as well as in topical-political information work, the future NCO's acquire

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basic Marxist-Leninist knowledge. Here they are taught also to cope with active political-ideological work with their subordinates. Special attention is devoted to the study of the classic authors of Marxism-Leninism, of party documents and decisions. Here long-term assignments for students have proved their worth. Following them, the NCO gets the opportunity in a seminar, in a brief lecture or in a seminar paper to present his thoughts about the content of the work, chapter, extract in connection with the covered subject matter, as well as concrete conclusions pertaining to his work. It has been our experience that through this method acquired basic knowledge is strengthened and made more applicable and, at the same time, good prerequisites are created for passing the subjects of the curriculum. The following works, among others, are given preference in student assignments:

Marx, K., Engels, F.: Manifesto of the Communist Party.

Lenin, V. I.: Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism.

Lenin, V. I.: The Tasks of Youth Associations.

Lenin, V. I.: The Military Program of the Proletarian Revolution.

In our opinion, social science training is the main way of developing the NCO candidates' qualifications for political work. It equips the future NCO with well-founded basic political knowledge, which is a prerequisite for effective political work. Especially in social science training, the NCO candidate gets what he needs to work with, and it is here that also his capacity must be strengthened for demonstrating a thesis, for argumentation, for polemical confrontation with political questions, arguments, and theses. At the same time, social science training must exercise such educational influence on him that it becomes a necessity for him to continually deepen his political knowledge and discuss political questions. In social science training, the NCO candidate at the same time is to acquire self-assurance in talking extemporaneously before the collective. With questions of political conduct and education as the subject matter, attention in training is centered here on practical exercises. For example, when the subject is "The Leading Role of the SED in the NVA...", a training sector covers the tasks of the FDJ organizations in the NVA, with NCO candidates learning especially about various ways of purposive work with young people.

Most of the NCO candidates perform honorary work in the youth league, in political and cultural work with the masses. Work in various capacities in the youth league, on the platoon, company and faculty level, work as agitator, literature supervisor, wall newspaper editor, member of the club board contributes significantly to qualifying a large number of NCO candidates for political work in the field. It is therefore precisely under

this aspect that special attention should be paid to the qualification and guidance of these functionaries at NCO schools.

Conducting Socialist Competition--a Guiding Example for the Future Work of Graduates in the Field

A central place in qualifying NCO candidates for political work is occupied by the conducting of the socialist competition. We believe that here, too, one must proceed from making the conducting of the socialist competition at the NCO school a guiding example for the future work of the graduates in the field. Therefore we proceed from the principle that the socialist competition at our NCO school is to fulfill two purposes. It serves to develop great activity in the struggle for high results in political and combat training, and at the same time it must represent methodical guidance for the future NCO on how to organize and conduct the socialist competition in the fighting collective. This makes great demands on conducting socialist competition by all commanding officers at the NCO school, for appropriate attention must be paid to both aspects.

In the socialist competition in his collective, the NCO candidate must learn to know and to use the educational and consciousness-forming potential of the competition through his own experience and activity. The entire preparation for assuming his duties as an individual, the striving for exemplary fulfillment must strengthen his conviction that his obligation is a personal espousal of our society and an important contribution to the strengthening of socialism. It is precisely this recognition of the political importance of the competition by the NCO candidate that we are extremely concerned with. It does not, of course, mature of its own accord; what is needed is to shape the preparation defense and fulfillment of the fighting program in such a way that they are experienced by the NCO candidates as an essential form of socialist democracy and concrete execution of power.

In this connection we attach special significance to thoroughly clarifying the question of the relation between command and initiative. The NCO candidates tackle this question very amply in concrete examples in their social science training, in political conversations, in discussions conducted in the collectives while preparing the fighting programs and striving for their fulfillment and in the mass control conducted by the FDJ. In our view, it is very important for the future work of the NCO in the field to understand that in the NVA command and creativity are not mutually contradictory, that the tasks of the commanding officer in the socialist competition and the voluntary assumption of an obligation form a whole.

Also in regard to qualifying future NCO's for conducting the socialist competition of their fighting collective, we regard as very valuable the

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political discussions conducted by superiors, members of the collective, party and FDJ officials with NCO candidates in order to mobilize them for assuming great but realistic obligations in the socialist competition.

These discussions at the same time show the NCO candidate how in the future in his fighting collective, on the basis of concepts worked out and carefully thought through by him, he must himself actively engage in political work and explain to his subordinates the aims and tasks of the competition as well as the content of the slogan of the competition. At the same time, he is familiarized in detail with the prerequisites for the five military decorations and with the best-worker-and-innovator regulation.

The direct participation of his platoon leader in the socialist competition serves as an example for his own future work in the field. The NCO candidate sees for himself that the platoon leader is not only the organizer of the socialist competition but, with his personal obligation, at the same time sets an example for all comrades of his platoon.

Experience indicates that in mastering set tasks in the field, graduates try to recall how this or that task was solved by them or by their superiors at the NCO school, and then to proceed likewise or similarly. Therefore the socialist competition at the NCO school must be conducted in exemplary fashion at all levels. We are intent on having NCO candidates participate in time in the evaluation of the competition results, in organizing sponsor work, in preparing and shaping FDJ mass control /massenkontrolle/, so that even during their training at the NCO school they gather as much practical experience as possible.

To Purposively Help the Young Cadres in the Field

It is necessary to continually follow up, through superiors, party and FDJ organizations in the army components and units, the purposive efforts which are undertaken at the NCO school to qualify the young NCO's to cope fully with their tasks in the field also from the political point of view. The young NCO must not be left on his own; he must feel from the first day that his commanding officer, the party and FDJ organization in his component and unit care about his further development.

The party and FDJ organization, especially its management, should already influence the purposive employment of the young NCO's. Talks with former graduates of the NCO school and with superiors from components and units show that effective support for the young NCO exists primarily where the basic party and FDJ organization helps the NCO's to comprehend quickly the points of emphasis and problems of political-ideological work in the unit; that it exists primarily where an effort is made to quickly make the young NCO's feel at home in the new basic organizations and to enlist them actively from the first day in political work, to give them concrete tasks commensurate

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with their knowledge and ability as well as their experience and to take their personal interests into consideration.

The support of the young NCO's by active party and FDJ work substantially influences their further qualification for effective political work. At the same time it confirms the NCO's in the conviction that they can fulfill their tasks only within and together with their fighting collective.

Experience indicates that the qualification of NCO candidates for political work at the NCO school and the constant continuation of this process in the field, constant assistance of graduates and their further qualification form a whole. The qualification for effective ideological work is "a broad field of comprehensive and not easy tasks. The decisive equipment consists in a solid Marxist-Leninist training. And the ability to apply this knowledge in the educational process is acquired primarily in the actual doing...."¹

In our view, the scope and importance of the task make it necessary to conduct even more purposively the exchange of experience between the NCO school and the field, as well as between individual NCO schools, especially about the most effective ways of continually improving the qualification of NCO's for political work.

FOOTNOTE

1. Hoffmann, H.: Topical Questions of Socialist Military Policy and the Growing Political and Military Demands Made of the NVA. In PARTEIARBEITER (Berlin). Special Issue "Party Aktiv Session," 1973, p 21.

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PHYSICAL TRAINING IN NVA TO BE INCREASED

East Berlin MILITAERWESFN in German May 75 pp 60-66

[By Lt Col H. Jodl, physical training instructor]

/Excerpt/ As is known, despite different and partly unfavorable initial levels at the beginning of military service, in past years the physical capacity of members of the army, as a universal, generalized result of military physical training and popular sports activity, has been continually developed through concentrated individual measures in the course of training. The number of units and components which were able to achieve good or very good marks at final exams and inspections is increasing constantly.

The achieved level becomes limited, however, if one takes as a basic objective and obligatory standard the new higher requirements of national defense and the state of physical development of the members of the Soviet Army. Comparable set standards of the Soviet Army--for instance, raising oneself on one arm and raising oneself on the horizontal bar with a 360 degree turn from a standing position, as parameters of military sports achievements in the area of proving one's strength, and the 3,000-meter run in combination with sharpshooting and distance handgrenade throwing--make it clear in what direction our own efforts are to be multiplied.

If we emphasize here especially one of the physical conditions, namely endurance, we do so because it is of extraordinary value in further raising one's physical capacity. In its general form, it is the capacity of the organism to resist fatigue and, owing to this, it is applicable to all military fields.

Wherever great things are accomplished, endurance is needed, an endurance which manifests itself in several specific forms--short-term, medium-term and long-term endurance, endurance of strength, of speed and of strength and speed combined. It is both the basis of action and sports as such and the general and supportive basis of motive accomplishments, for endurance is transferrable to other courses of action. Whoever, for example, has the endurance for long distance running can marshal endurance also in rowing, bicycling, forced marching and similar cyclic motions. He is enabled to do so by the increase in circulation potential as a result of endurance training. Without sufficiently developed endurance, means of training for developing other abilities, such as speed, strength, coordination and mobility cannot be employed effectively. Raising oneself on the rings or shotputting or volleyball, too, require endurance. In the order of conditioning capacities, endurance is, therefore, given precedence over all others. In military physical training, this state of affairs is reflected in endurance training being allotted a sizable share of training time.

Endurance Training Deserves Precedence

Endurance training also plays a dominant part in maintaining and strengthening one's health. The fact alone that more and more it is being acknowledged as an effective means of preventing diseases of the heart and circulation makes it obligatory to examine many a way of life that has become comfortable and is lacking in exercise. Moreover, regular endurance training serves to regularize the maintenance or recovery of standard body weight. Fortunately, in recent times more and more members of the army are turning to running, the least demanding and most productive form of endurance training.

Activities which have become popular, such as "Mile Awhile," "Anniversary Mile," "Friendship Mile" and "Run Yourself Sound," apart from the obligatory training, have led to remarkable results. Nevertheless, two diametrically opposite trends are apparent at present in the army members' way of life: a positive trend toward increasing employment of sports activity and a negative trend of harmful habits combined with reduced exercise. Not least with a view to better fulfillment of military tasks, the latter trend must be opposed even more decisively. There is no activity which equals regular physical training in affecting the ability of the organism to perform.

Open up Reserves for Heightening Psychical Stability!

To write about problems of military physical training without mentioning its contribution to heightening the psychological endurance of army members would mean from the start to write untopically and incompletely. Of course, here we can discuss it only from the point of view of increasing physical

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capacity. If one proceeds from the recognized thesis that unflinching psychological stability for successful fighting in modern combat is developed primarily through corresponding political-moral education and through training which approximates the reality of the combat as far as possible, it is not difficult to come to realizations and conclusions as regards pertinent potentials in the area of military physical training.

This duty simply derives from the fact that great physical demands, such as they are made in military physical training, form a whole with psychological demands. Exceptionally great physical effort, prompted for example by the toughness exercises, at the same time are tied to great demands as regards moral qualities, as regards the army members' fighting qualities of courage, perseverance and self-control. Any hard physical training which taxes the individual to the limit of his ability requires great psychological stability. Therefore, the demands made in the process of physical training intended to tax the individual to the limit of his capacity are always aimed at creating such test situations as to prepare army members to cope with situations loaded with emotional tension. Of course, here it must be taken into account that any training, however hard it may and however close it may come to actual combat, can only approximate the reality of combat. This is true also, without qualification, as far as physical training is concerned. But even if one takes into account that tense combat situations are merely imitated--which is underlined by the necessary safety measures--the fact remains that one has practiced and learned to overcome insecurity, anxiety, fear of something heretofore unknown. This is true, for example, of actions in close combat, of overcoming water obstacles while swimming, of jumping into the water with uniform, helmet and submachine gun, vertical and horizontal climbing at fairly great heights, overcoming the wall of a house in the line of attack, and other phases of exercise.

Coping with such elements of danger inherent in the subject matter of physical training makes one become more secure and confirms one's conviction to be able to master similar situations which may occur at some future time.

In such a way, military physical training is confronted with great tasks as regards psychological preparation for combat. At present, attempts to solve problems of increasing psychological capacity are occasionally made only spontaneously. It is more and more necessary to integrate such attempts into the physical training complex and in a planned and purposive manner. Beyond that, more far-reaching thought must be devoted to ways of expanding and deepening the contribution of military physical training to the heightening of the psychological stability of army members.

Preserve Continuity, Take New Requirements Into Account!

All in all it can be said that military physical training, resting on a firm foundation of secured military-pedagogical and military-psychological

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realizations and rich experience and supported by the treasure of knowledge of the Soviet Army and the other fraternal armies, is being developed further in a direction which takes into account the increasingly greater demands of combat training and modern combat. Proven positions are being expanded, and new tasks deriving from the development of the military are being integrated into the development concept of military physical training. In this, while preserving the continuity of advance development, increased attention will have to be paid to such problems as fully utilizing the potential of military physical training for developing a socialist military demeanor, for instilling conscious, tight discipline and precise mastery of the elements of drilling. The central task is, and remains, the further heightening of the physical and psychological capacity of army members, and this must take place not by way of increasing the time of instruction but by increase of intensiveness. For this great reserves are to be found in an even better organization and execution of physical training as part of combat training. It would be desirable if field officers and representatives of other branches of training were to devote greater attention to this very problem also in publications. This is how the systematic continual further development of military physical training should be understood.

COMMENTARY CRITICAL OF STRAUSS TRIP TO PRC

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German May 75 pp 77-80

[Commentary by Mi.]

/Text/ It was Franz Josef Strauss, for decades the famed/infamous representative of the military-industrial complex, and thus of the most aggressive circles, of the FRG, who traveled to China. There he met the top leaders of the Chinese military bureaucratic regime and was the first FRG politician to be received by Mao Tse-tung. All talks were distinguished by two characteristics: anti-Sovietism and opposition to detente. The mutuality deriving from this is already traditional. In 1968, for instance, Strauss published his harmful anti-Soviet concept "Challenge and Answer. A Program for Europe." According to Strauss, the policy set forth therein against the socialist community of states and European security prompted the desire in Peking to engage in talks with him.

As early as in the beginning of the seventies, Mao Tse-tung, taking a leaf out of the "Challenge," spread his theses about the struggle against the "superpowers," and for some years Chinese propaganda has depicted Strauss as a "stalwart defender of a clearly anti-Soviet line."¹

Now anti-Sovietism has been stirred anew through personal contacts. This became most clearly apparent in the inflammatory slogan about the alleged threat by the Soviet Union which was being spread over and over. In this connection, it is significant that the Mao clique for some time has supported the thesis that West Europe is in greater danger than China. Thus, deputy chief of the general staff Li Da declared in conversation with Strauss: "Nothing is more important for the Soviets than to conquer Europe...."² This

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Chinese propaganda myth, among other things, serves to sow mistrust against the socialist peace offensive and to hinder the continuing process of detente in Europe. The FRG layer of mines against detente and disarmament. F. J. Strauss, was very happy to hear about the thesis of the /Soviet/ threat. Small wonder, then, that (according to Western press reports) Strauss and Chinese Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua "expressed strongly worded misgivings about the policy of detente."³

Nor did the chairman of the Bavarian CSU miss the opportunity to get to know the Chinese preparations for war. He was shown large bunker complexes, inspected troops of an infantry division and spoke with military personnel also about principles of employing nuclear weapons. In the course of this, Strauss recommended increased construction of missile systems. But the military-political talks on both sides centered more on NATO. Both Strauss and the Mao group are interested in speeding armament in West Europe. According to BAYERNKURIER of 18 January 1975, the Chinese leaders emphasized again and again "that from their point of view, the political and military unification of Europe today is an urgent demand of the hour." The envoy of the FRG armament combines was especially grateful for this "exhortation,"⁴ because the Peking leaders thus assured Strauss of their support for his plans opposed to detente--to promote and accomplish intensive armament of NATO by every means, so that the military factor is employed more strongly as a means of political pressure against socialism.

The political agreement of opinion of the two sides which became clearly apparent during Strauss' China trip is also a sign of the new move to the right in China's foreign policy, which "increases the danger of closer collusion of the forces of reaction against the objective realities in Europe, against the process of detente."⁵ This, in turn, leaves no doubt about the fact that the struggle of the progressive forces for further detente requires a tough confrontation with reaction and the consistent unmasking of all attempts to impede the process of detente. All attempts at disruption notwithstanding, the socialist community of states persistently advocates the promoting of political detente and the complementing of it by military detente. It makes every effort to narrow further the political elbowroom of the proponents of the cold war and to make the trend of detente irreversible.

FOOTNOTES

1. Quotation of FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (Frankfurt/Main) 14 Jan 75.
2. DPA (Bonn) 14 Jan 75.
3. Quotation of ADN (Berlin) 15 Jan 75.

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4. DIE WELT (Hamburg) 23 Jan 75.
5. Norden, A.: How Maoism Fights Against Peace in Europe. In NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (Edition B) 8 Jan 75.

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PROBLEMS INDICATED IN COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German May 75 pp 98A-100A

[By Maj Gen A Seefeld]

/Text/ Socialist relationships are one of socialist society's decisive advantages. They constitute an important factor of superiority in the socialist armed forces over any imperialist aggressor. Their foundation lies in identical class interests and objectives, regardless of service rank and position. Through making genuine socialist relationships real, we are increasingly living up to having man play a greater role in socialist society and in military affairs. By our systematically and purposefully developing the socialist relationships, the impulses and potentials for the struggle for a high combat readiness, which are rooted in the nature of our social order, become fully effective. Thus the socialist relationships constitute an important factor in the combat readiness of our troop components and units, of all our military collectives. I should like to present some experiences of how we have exercised our influence on strengthening socialist relationships in the staffs.

We started from the proposition that the development of firm socialist relationships was an important ideological task and also significantly depended on the quality of leadership activity. The role of the party organizations is very important here. Relationships among the party members, their exemplary nature, are of a decisive influence. Thus it was our endeavor to create within our party collectives an atmosphere of communist affiliation and trust. To the extent that this is successful, we will radiate as communists and determine the relationships in the officers corps and in the military collectives.

We consider a priority task explaining to our command cadre and officers very deeply what we mean by socialist relationships and what importance they have in our raising our fighting strength and combat readiness. In a practical way we explained to them the dialectics that exists between the socialist relationships, military discipline and order, and the continuing struggle for increasing our combat readiness. It was demonstrated how and by what means disturbed socialist relationships can be recognized and evaluated. This was a very important process of clarification. In this connection we used party meetings, advanced social science training seminars, and individual talks, in order to form uniform views about it. Our objective was for superior officers more strongly to pay attention to the socialist relationships as an important factor in increasing the fighting strength and combat readiness and in command and training work.

The intensive ideological work in preparation of the 25th anniversary of the founding of the GDR and since the start of our new training year has helped us advance a good deal in consolidating socialist relationships in many troop components and units. Cooperation between staff officers, especially that of the chiefs and commanders, has solidified with respect to the solution of all tasks. They now know better how to influence the development of socialist relationships in their collectives and also in the subordinate staffs. We managed to reach a point where the staff officers, through their work, during control and preparation measures, contributed toward eliminating violations of socialist relationships, disregard for collectivity, and other phenomena. It strengthens the confidence of the subordinates and mutual respect.

One important task we saw was in recording and analyzing the socialist relationships in the command collectives and staffs, between superiors and subordinates, and especially between young officers and career NCO's, and in deriving conclusions from that for our work. That does not always succeed and is not simple. It calls for purposeful work with the collectives involved, for thorough familiarity with the officers, NCO's and soldiers and, mainly, for judging the phenomena, problems and educational questions especially from the vantage point of socialist relationships.

Our special attention in the educational work is devoted to the education of the staff commanders and officers. We start from the proposition that staff commanders and officers are, first and foremost, formed in the party collective. Their authority essentially depends on their conduct in the party collective, their active participation in party affairs, their partisanship and firmness in principle, their attitude of self-criticism, and the manner in which they fit themselves into the party collective.

Our experiences tell us, among other things, that we can consolidate the socialist relationships in the officers collective by further raising our

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responsibility to the junior officers. Taking on sponsorships for junior officers, especially on the company level, has helped these young cadre in better understanding their educational tasks. The senior officers also became familiar with the problems of the junior officers. This made helping and instructing more goal-orientated. It has helped strengthen the relationship of trust and promote a partisan and open atmosphere among the officers. This method has found a good resonance among the young officers. Consultations with young officers have confirmed that. Many officers were thus helped in better solving the manifold problems of military service.

Though socialist relationships were strengthened everywhere, differences still exist. One still finds heartless conduct here and there, insufficient care for the personal concerns of the army personnel. Not always, in the relationships among the comrades, is the class comrade being respected, and not all superior officers are models.

That no letup be allowed in the service also is part of the socialist relationships. That is an important task the superior officers have in peacetime, in the interest of safeguarding the lives of his subordinates in wartime. One must overcome characteristics such as arrogance, bragging, pomposity, a know-it-all attitude, rudeness and disdain, which can still be found here and there. Wherever such signs are found among superiors, we try to overcome them with the help of the party collective. One cause for erroneous conduct on the part of some superior officers lies in their not adequately knowing, and enforcing, our service regulations and instructions. Nor has it always been understood that violations against them are at the same time violations against the socialist relationships and our socialist moral standards. We have observed repeatedly that commanding officers and party organizations do not always react at once to such violations. The causes for the wrong behavior in mutual relations often can be found in a deficient attitude toward our people. This has taught us to develop party education still more effectively in our SED basic organization--especially for the superior military officers, in order to establish an all round model quality of all members and candidates and thereby further to enhance the radiating power of our party organization. Preceding from the place and role of socialist relations for combat readiness, we have deduced for our further command activity that it is necessary to do the following:

(1) To organize and lead the political-ideological educational work more purposefully especially for all the superior officers. An important task we find here is the further raising of the effectiveness of social science advanced education, of political training, and of the ideological level in the membership meetings of the SED basic organizations.

(2) To further develop the relationship of trust among the superior officers, beginning with the staffs, and to promote in all collectives a

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partisan and frank atmosphere, especially through an exemplary conduct by the communists in relation to those not belonging to a party.

(3) To involve the subordinates, more than before, in the fulfillment of the tasks, by thoroughly explaining the objectives to them and by inspiring their initiatives for the fulfillment of the tasks.

(4) To develop more strongly law propaganda and law consciousness, consistently to live up to the service regulations and legal provisions, with the support from all superior officers, not to tolerate any letup in the service, and to realize our high demands with our people.

EFFORTS TO IMPROVE TACTICAL TRAINING DISCUSSED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German May 75 pp 101A-107A

[By Lt Col E. Brummund]

/Text/ Higher demands are made on the troop components and units by the documents that have been introduced on the further development of combat training for the ground forces. As last year's experiences show, however, the tasks have been successfully solved through the common efforts of all army personnel, and combat training could be systematically improved. This positive sign showed up most impressively at the final tests. The causes mainly lie in improved command control over the main measures in combat training by the commanding officers. Among these main measures are the interrelated aspects of tactics training.

This contribution means to generalize the experience gathered during the last training year in the planning and execution of this training complex. Remarks will be restricted to complexes 1 to 3, which were carried out prior to testing the cohesion of the platoons.

Purpose and Content of the Training Complexes

A systematic and complete fulfillment of the higher tasks in tactics training, especially the larger share of unit training and the comprehensive use of combat training vehicles, required a new kind of organization in this branch of training. At the same time it was important to create more favorable conditions for making tactics training more combat-related.

In order to fulfill these tasks and to secure a systematic employment of combat training vehicles, as well as a rational utilization of the terrain

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for tactics training, the topics requiring combat training ordnance for their implementation were combined on the level of the motorized rifle company (MSK), according to the various types of combat, into training complexes.

The training complexes are organized in such a way that all platoons of a motorized rifle company begin their training simultaneously by starting with different topics, which are rotated in a given order (as a rule, 3 times), and when all platoons have been trained in the topics assigned, they all finish the training at the same time.

One training complex normally takes 20 hours. When the topics change, the combat training vehicles stay with the platoons, but the security equipment remains behind at the training sites. Before the training complex ends, the training combat vehicles of the motorized rifle company are checked for being in operating condition, at a central place. The training terminates with the handing over of the combat training equipment and the security equipment to the subsequent company (Diagram 1).

Based on these principles, the program for the combat training of motorized infantry units comes with variants for the training complexes.¹ They are meant to be applied by the commanding officers of the troop components in accordance with local conditions.

These variants offer to combat training the following advantages: Important preconditions were created for the planning of the most important topics and in the use and maintenance of the combat training equipment; the central securing, preparation and execution of important training measures according to uniform ideas within the troop component were reduced to a reasonable degree; the terrain for tactics training is rationally used, and a clear orientation is provided for its further development; and favorable conditions are created for a combat-related form of training and the high physical and psychological stress on the trainees.

Why is the Planning of the Training Complexes so Important?

To be able to plan the training complexes, one must be thoroughly familiar with the specifications in the combat training documents. To see to it that the regimental commander makes sure that his deputy, the battalion commanders, and all staff officers involved in planning will study these documents before the semiannual planning is started, has proven itself in practice. And it has turned out to be useful to connect such study with the experiences and insights gained in the implementation of the training complexes of the previous half year of training. That makes sure that the conclusions drawn from it will be taken into account in the planning process, which improves the quality of planning for the complexes. It is furthermore important to the planning of the training complexes to have a realistic view of the

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


Diagram 1: A Variant of Sequences Within One Training Complex (Complex 2)

Key:

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. 1st to 4th hour (day) | 13. 0100 to 0600 hours |
| 2. 5th to 8th hour (day) | 14. Retrieving and removing wounded; operations with combat vehicles |
| 3. 1430 to 1800 hours | 15. Squad on the Defensive |
| 4. 1st to 4th hour (night) | 16. Platoon on the Defensive |
| 5. 5th to 8th hour (night) | 17. Tactics Training |
| 6. 1st motorized rifle platoon | 18. Platoon on ambush |
| 7. Squad on the Defensive | 19. Maintenance of ordnance, arms and equipment. Readying and passing on the ordnance |
| 8. Platoon on the Defensive | 20. Retrieving and removing wounded; operations with combat vehicles |
| 9. Tactics Training | 21. Platoon as combat reconnaissance unit |
| 10. Break in combat. Moving into and securing accommodations. Mess under field conditions. Political work (topical talks, briefings, watching documentaries, Red Cross work, and so forth). Preparation for night training | 22. Squad on the Defensive |
| 11. Retrieving and removing wounded; operations with combat vehicles | 23. Platoon on the Defensive |
| 12. Platoon as combat reconnaissance unit | 24. Tactics Training |

training base at hand, especially of the terrain for the troop component's training in tactics. That includes knowledge about the degree of development, the state of electrification and mechanization, the scope and condition of the terrain, the maintenance and repair conditions for the equipment, the capacity computations, the approach and withdrawal routes, the distances from the target, and so forth.

As the training complexes 1 to 3 are carried out primarily in the terrain for tactics training, those data are very important. Planning should not distribute training sites at random, but, with an eye to possibilities extant, meaningful and combat-related training must be organized. This effort is supported by controlling the combat training in that the control officers, along with the training itself, also check the suitability of planning and hold on to what insights they may gather for the benefit of the next half-year of training.

How Training Complexes 1 to 3 Ought to be Planned

Training complexes 1 to 3 consist of themes for squad and platoon training and are as a rule carried out in the first 6 to 8 weeks of the semiannual training cycle. The climax and conclusion of these training complexes, that is, the period of squad and platoon training, is in the testing of the platoons' cohesion. Accordingly, the objective of training complexes 1 to 3 lies in preparing the platoons for their cohesion and in creating conditions for a successful conclusion of this training period.

The planning for the training complexes must correspond to these objectives. It must make sure that all platoons of the troop component will, under identical conditions and preconditions, reach good and very good results when their cohesion is tested. But the preparation and testing of the platoons' cohesion will be successful only if all training measures required for it will first be systematically planned and executed. From this, the following requirements for the planning of the training complexes can be derived:

Planning must ensure the necessary continuity between the training complexes. This can be explained by the example of training complex 2. This complex entails tactics training (motorized rifle squad on the defensive and motorized rifle platoon on the defensive, the tactics training) and reconnaissance training (motorized rifle platoon as a combat reconnaissance unit).

In order to reach the training objective for this complex, certain preparatory themes for each given branch of training have to be planned: Combat exercises for the motorized rifle platoon on the defensive as preparation for tactics training and--in reconnaissance training--"structure, armaments and employment principles of the enemy" and "observation post activities."

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The necessary supplementary efforts by other branches of training, such as protection, engineering and medical training, must be properly integrated with the rest of training. It will make sure that the soldiers' abilities and skills in the training branches mentioned will be strengthened and perfected during the tactics training for combat-related situations.

In setting down his ideas for carrying out the semiannual combat training, the regimental commander will proceed from the nature of the tasks that have to be met and from the training status of the soldiers and units.

He will also take into account that the topics of the various training branches will be repeated in every half year of training.

The planning of the training of the squad and platoon leaders is closely connected with planning the combat training for the platoons and companies. It has already become a sound practice in some troop components to co-ordinate substantively all forms of training for NCO's and officers, such as methods courses, military training, and preparation for the service, and to integrate them meaningfully with the main measures in the units' combat training.

A pertinent example: If complex 2 is carried out late in June, it is suitable to plan the "defense" topic also for NCO training and carry it out beforehand.

The same applies to complex 3 in July. Prior to it there should be military NCO training in the topic of "the motorized rifle platoon on the offensive."

In these troop components the training officers got the necessary head start in being prepared for the combat training they would then give their units, which systematically and purposefully prepared the NCO's for meeting their tasks.

Along with qualifying the training officers, the use of combat training equipment also must be planned for. Such equipment gets a lot of use in the training complexes. For that reason, not only its use, but its maintenance and repair also, must be accurately planned. This should also include the employment of the necessary repair capacities.

In troop components that are close to their tactics training terrain, the following procedure is being tested: After any three companies have gone through one training complex, one day is set aside for the maintenance and repair of the equipment. That also is the day when the training installations, equipment and devices are overhauled and repaired.

The object is to keep losses in training equipment and installations as low as possible because such losses always interfere badly with combat training.

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Some troop components, while planning the training complexes, already take into account the service and housing conditions of the officers and NCO's. It was ensured that tactics training would not be compressed into a relatively brief time span. Arrangements also were made in the daily schedules of the training complexes for the officers and NCO's to structure their time (see Diagram 2). Here one can read, for example: "When the maintenance of the training equipment begins, at 0100 hours, one officer or NCO leaves the unit and goes home. Off-duty time for the career soldiers begins at 0800 hours. The battalion medical warrant officer supervises the soldiers taking showers. The officer or NCO who had been excused from maintenance returns to the company area at 1430 hours and takes charge of activities till evening."

Diagram 2: Variant of Daily Schedule for Training Complexes 2 and 3

<u>Time</u>	<u>Action</u>
0430	Reveille
0435-0455	Morning toilet and cleaning quarters
0500	Weapons issue
0530	Departure for training area
0600-0715	Receiving equipment at maintenance site
0715-0755	Breakfast in the field and checking training installations
0800-1100	1st to 4th daytime training hours
1100-1130	Rotation of training sites
1130-1430	5th to 8th daytime training hours
1430-1800	Break; moving into and securing accommodations; mess under field conditions; political work (briefings, topical talks, watching documentaries, Red Cross work, and so forth). Preparation for night training.
1800-2100	1st to 4th night training hours
2100-2200	Mess under field conditions and rotation of training sites
2200-0100	5th to 8th night training hours
0100-0600	Maintenance of equipment, arms and equipment. Readyng and handing on combat training vehicles
0600-0715	Handing on equipment to the next company
0715	Departure for quarters
0715-0800	Handing in weapons and equipment
0800-0830	Breakfast
0830-0915	Laundry exchange and showers
0930-1430	Bed rest
1430-1500	Lunch
1510-1520	Assignments issued
1520-1830	Off-duty and cultural work
1830-1900	Supper
1900-2140	Personal leisure
2145	Room inspection
2200	Taps

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This example shows that it is quite possible to fulfill service assignments completely and still to ensure adequate leisure conditions for career soldiers.

Preparing the Training Complexes

Experiences in the last semiannual training cycle have shown that wherever the training complexes are carried out along uniform ideas within a troop component, the level of proficiency improves considerably. Such practice significantly simplifies the preparation of the training complexes and avoids unnecessary experimenting, by the battalion commanders and company chiefs, with combat training.

The commanders of the troop components took on the main responsibility for preparing the training complexes and had an influence on what they contained and how they proceeded. They say quite clearly that great improvement in the quality of combat training could be attained only through increasing the skills of the training officers, mainly the squad leaders. Proceeding from that, primarily major topics in tactics training were dealt with in the methods courses for squad and platoon leaders. The commanding officers of the troop components assigned the best and most experienced battalion commanders, company chiefs and staff officers as training officers. These methods courses, with combat-related training for squad and platoon leaders, were a main prerequisite for a target-directed implementation of the training complexes in yielding high results. Furthermore, the preparation of the training officers for the training complexes proceeds through military training in accordance with the programs established. It must be ensured that the topics of these programs, which serve the preparation of the training officers for any given training complex, will be completed ahead of the training itself. And furthermore, in the process of preparation, the superior officer must render precise the established plans for the training, adapt them to local conditions, and familiarize the training officers with the details of the idea of the training.

Another essential aspect in preparing the training complexes lies in complete material-technical security. It is necessary for every training complex to have available the training and camouflage equipment right within the troop component, in accordance with the training plans. For technical security purposes, one must determine the amount of combat training equipment and fuel and lubricants, the maintenance sites, the maintenance repair teams, and the maintenance periods and the passing on of the training combat ordnance to the succeeding company. The training complexes can be prepared by appropriate documentaries, such as "Close Antitank Combat" for complex 1 or "Motorized Rifle Company on the Defensive," for complex 2. These documentaries may be shown as actual preparation for the training complexes or in breaks during training. In many companies and battalions these preparatory projects are actively supported by the party and FDJ

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organizations. In discussions and meetings army members are preparing themselves for meeting their tasks in the training complexes. For fresh recruits, sponsorships are organized.

The Training Complex Command

The main task of the regimental commander and of the battalion commanders in running the training complexes lies in the timely and comprehensive preparation, that is, the planning, of these complexes. The commander of the troop component elaborates together with his deputies the uniform idea for preparing and commanding the training complexes for all units. Under this idea he determines, among other things, the content, sequence and time span for carrying out those training complexes; the organization of preparing the training officers; measures, responsibility and schedules for material-technical safeguards; the order and schedules for the maintenance and repair of the training combat ordnance and training installations; and the control and direction by his deputies, battalion commanders and staff officers.

Thereby the regimental commander ensures consistent and uniform training for all platoons in training complexes 1 to 3 and a centralized training and preparation for the training officers in the troop component.

It has proven advantageous to simultaneously establish not only the planning, but also the measures by which the commanders and staff officers can take a direct influence on the preparation and implementation of the training complexes.

Among the most effective and rational methods in exercising a direct influence are personal controls by the commander, his deputy and the staff officers, and instruction on controls within the units.

Controls are always effective, and are of advantage to further improve the quality of combat training, when the regimental commander assigns the control officers their tasks in time and ensures their personal preparations for the control. A pertinent example: In a troop component the commander charged his deputy for training with preparing the officers for their control tasks. Under his guidance the officers studied from the combat training program the section entitled "Organization of political and combat training," the tasks of training, the organizational-methodological instructions and the topics to be dealt with in the various branches of training. From the section on tactics training methods, they studied the general stipulations on organization and the methods used for tactics training, methodological instructions for tactics training, the implementation plans including the literature on the subject, and the standards for combat training.

By means of this method the regimental commander succeeded in having all control officers, deeply informed and with uniform views, enforce his

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conception and idea on how the training complexes should be handled in the companies. The commander placed the following demands on the control officers: They had to start their controls in the units at the proper time in order to be able to give support and instruction to the company chiefs and platoon and squad leaders even while the training complex activities were being planned. And also, they should not only control and assess the technical and methodological skills of the training officers; they should at the same time draw conclusions regarding further improvements of security, training preparation, and the course of planning and organization.

Controls thus prepared provided the commander of the troop component with the necessary information about positive and exemplary training methods, and also about deficiencies and shortcomings in the training. This in turn made it possible for him in time to take the measures necessary.

Another method for exercising a direct influence and leadership in the training complexes is instruction on controls. It should be given with respect to the most important themes of combat training by the commanders, their deputies and the staff officers in the units. Such topics may be: The motorized rifle platoon on the defensive, or on the offensive. It is of advantage if all company chiefs are present at the first control instruction sessions on the themes mentioned.

Experiences thus far indicate that there are still quite some problems with the planning and implementation of instruction on controls. In one case, instruction on controls was scheduled for a time when the leader of the training groups (a platoon leader) had been detailed to another training assignment. The good thing was that organized training was assured even during the absence of the platoon leader. On the other hand, it was impossible to reach an essential objective of control instruction, that is, to demonstrate to the platoon leaders those suitable training methods. At times there may be an advantage in carrying out control instruction as described here, but for a general solution of the problem this method cannot be recommended.

Many commanders and officers have found out that the quality of control instruction depends on their personal preparation. Observing the so-called "little things" is of special importance here. To do all the things according to the regulations is very important. For example, how to get down and how to get up, how to hand over the weapon, the language in which to give commands, and so forth. This is all so important because, in the process of platoon and squad training, the soldiers' individual training also must constantly be perfected and strengthened. The example of the commander or the staff officer must take effect here particularly. An experienced commander and officer knows well enough that he will, through his exact manner and through acting according to regulations, also in matters of detail, receive high recognition and respect from his subordinates.

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By means of control instruction, the commander sets the standards for combat-related and high-grade training, generalizes and demonstrates the best and most suitable training methods, enforces his idea and his will in practice, and thus ensures a high-level command over the training complexes.

The subject matters of the combat training programs are repeated on a semi-annual basis, which naturally includes the training complexes of tactics training. It makes possible systematically further to improve the quality of training through a conscious and methodical exploitation of all the experiences gathered in the training process.

For systematically improving the complex training, the commanders, while the training is going on as well as afterwards, must critically check and evaluate its quality, to find where matters have to be spelled out more precisely to be further improved. The following elements should here be looked at: The planning of the training complexes; the placement and process of the training; material and technical security; the training installations; the preparation of the training officers; and the maintenance for the ordnance under field conditions.

The more consciously and consistently this task is met the faster the quality of the training complexes within the troop component will improve, for the benefit of a high degree of cohesion within the platoons.

FOOTNOTE

1. "Programm fuer die Gefechtsausbildung, Teil I/1, Mot. Schuetzen" (Combat Training Program, Part I/1, Motorized Infantry," 1973, Appendix 5, Page 1.

AIR FORCES COMMANDER CALLS FOR INCREASED COMBAT READINESS

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German May 75 pp 98B-102B

[Lt Gen W. Reinhold, deputy minister of defense and commander of the Air Force/Air Defense Command]

/Text/ On 8 May 1945, the fascist power and its Wehrmacht surrendered unconditionally to the Red Army and the other armies of the anti-Hitler coalition. The total military destruction of fascist German imperialism and the liberation of the German people from Hitler's fascism were the result, primarily, of the heroic sacrificial struggle by the glorious Soviet Army. This victory over the most predatory and aggressive part of world imperialism emphatically demonstrated that all attempts had finally failed to eliminate the Soviet Union and thus, to cancel the inevitable transition from capitalism to socialism. This was a triumph of the socialist social system, an expression of its vitality and invincibility. It became apparent that an invincible force had arisen in socialism that would set a halt to imperialist aggressions and provide the world with the prospect of permanent peace. Never shall we forget that our people's liberation from fascism, for which we have to thank the heroic efforts undertaken by the Soviet Army, paved the way to the emergence and development of the socialist GDR.

Today, 30 years later, the achievements of communist development in the Soviet Union and the results of the shaping of the socialist society in the states of our community are emerging ever more clearly. They fundamentally changed the power ratio in favor of socialism. These 30 years since our liberation have been 3 decades of struggle by the socialist countries for strengthening the peace, against the reactionary policy of imperialism, against its attempts at slandering, hurting and, ultimately,

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liquidating socialism. For that purpose, imperialism had unleashed the "cold war," in which it engaged with immense forces and means. Hundreds of billions of dollars were squeezed out of the peoples for it.

That unprecedented "crusade against communism" and the staging of no less than 104 acts of military aggression and conflict could not free imperialism out of its historically inevitable defensive role. It has suffered defeats of a truly historic importance. The imperialist powers did not succeed in stopping the spread of socialism through Europe, Asia and even to the gates of America itself. We mainly have to thank for this the firm alliance of socialist states and its cohesive military power, with the Soviet Union in the lead.

The establishment of the Warsaw Pact 20 years ago was wholly in line with the historical inevitabilities of the socialist revolution, with the historic task before the socialist armed forces: To shore up by military means mankind's revolutionary world process from capitalism to socialism. It was at the same time a response to that imperialism military policy which aimed at putting together aggressive military blocs and systems of bases, at forming a cohesive imperialist military group under U.S. leadership and thus, at putting political and military pressure on the socialist states.

The Warsaw Pact--a Peace-Preserving Factor

In the Warsaw Pact a coalition of a socialist nature arose in which the Leninist call for a collective defense of socialism became reality, and the peace-preserving function of which is inevitably implied in its social principles. And so today, through the cooperation among the fraternal armies of the allied socialist countries, we are implementing Lenin's words which obligated us, through armed struggle in the defense of socialism, "to bring about in practical terms the international brotherhood among the peoples. I am convinced," Lenin said on 2 August 1919 in a speech during a demonstration of the Warsaw Revolutionary Regiment, "if you combine all your military forces into one powerful international Red Army, then no power of the imperialists can hold up against us."¹ By those words the members of the Air Force and Air Defense Command in the National People's Army let themselves be guided in the fulfillment of their military duties. Our soldiers, NCO's, warrant officers, officers and generals, in pursuing their difficult assignments, mainly proceed from the consideration that a steady increase in military strength and in the superiority of socialism, an incessant improvement in the combat readiness of the socialist armed forces, and the ever firmer fraternal rallying by the fraternal armies around the Soviet Army are a main factor in the change of the power ratio in favor of socialism and of all anti-imperialist forces. We know that the further enforcement of the policy of peaceful coexistence among states with differing social systems, against the resistance of the most aggressive and reactionary forces in the world, keeps

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making new and higher demands on our combat readiness, on the will for military achievement and on the readiness to serve by each and every one, on his internationalist thought and action, his military knowledge and skills. Imperialism does not alter its aggressive nature and cannot alter it. As long as it exists it will be a source of war. "Modern militarism is a result of capitalism, its mode of life."²

We must always remember that Leninist realization. And therefore it is also necessary to watch most attentively the imperialist military policy, the forceful armaments and war preparations by the NATO states, and to draw the necessary conclusions for our own fighting strength and combat readiness.

Characteristics of NATO Rearmament, Mainly its Air Offensive Potential

The NATO states, in accordance with the NATO Council resolutions, are improving the qualitative capabilities of their armed forces to make them more effective and independent of any mobilization. They are increasing the number of offensive air weapons, are improving them constantly, and are raising the intensity of combat training. They are equipping their offensive air forces with new air-to-ground rockets which have a high flying speed, great ranges and a small reflection area. Comprehensive modernization programs for the existing rocket systems are under way, and tactical and air-borne forces are being improved. For example, the NATO states are improving the effectiveness of nuclear weapons operations by introducing the operational-tactical Lance rocket system and pushing ahead with the F-4 E Phantom fighter. Even in the course of this year, for strengthening the air force potential of the European NATO states,³ an additional introduction of the following weapons systems is scheduled: 238 combat and naval reconnaissance aircraft, 123 helicopters, 836 AA rockets and 530 AA guns. Until 1978, some 600 fighter aircraft are scheduled to be equipped with the latest devices for electronic warfare. Some 100 fighter aircraft are to have laser target scanners by 1976, and 68 fighters are being equipped this year with stronger propulsion systems.

The FRG Air Force, having almost 35 percent of the fighter aircraft potential, next to the U.S. Air Force NATO's strongest air contingent in Central Europe, will get another significant boost in fighting strength by the end of the '70's. Within the framework of a comprehensive program, plans call for adding the French-West German Alpha Jet aircraft, undergoing tests at present, and the Panavia-200, also known as MRCA. The improved operational possibilities of these new types of aircraft, marked by wider range, increased all-weather capability, greater, more effective and more varied arms carrying capacities, higher speed and more favorable maneuverability, will significantly improve the fighting strength and combat potential of Bonn's Air Force. The arms carrying capacity will go up two to threefold, the action radius by 1 1/2 to two times, and the flying speed in the high subsonic and, especially with the MRCA, in the supersonic range.

This rearmament program, which is proceeding similarly in all armed components of the NATO armies, goes hand in hand with the improvement in tactical operational principles. The operational objective lies in reaching air superiority by massive increase in aircraft and in surmounting the air defense system of the Warsaw Pact states. For its purpose it is intended to apply a great variety of tactical procedures. Among them are aircraft operations at a narrow front, operations with low and high-flying aircraft and the simultaneous use of efficient electronic countermeasures, and the use of all kinds of maneuvers.

The appearance of a new generation of rockets in the armament of the strategic air forces is meant to permit strikes against targets without having to fly into the target and interception zones of the air defense.

Air Defense Forces Constantly Combat Ready and With Modern Equipment

All experiences made thus far indicate that our air defense forces, the means of anti-aircraft by all components of our armed forces, will be the first to be confronted with the military forces of an aggressor who will try to use the element of surprise. It is therefore of decisive importance to be able to react fast and effectively, in order to maintain the initiative in every phase of combat. The air defense operations of all components must, above all, excel in operative skill, high activity, purposiveness and accuracy. A great efficacy on their part, however, largely depends on close cooperation, which must be organized in as simple and uncomplicated a manner as possible and requires intensive training. An important basis for that lies in consistently enforcing the measures set down in our plans.

This enables the air defense forces to be always ready to detect offensive aircraft, and destroy them before they reach their target. High dynamics and the rapid tempo of combat activities as well as the massive deployment of manned and unmanned means of air attack by the enemy require all air defense forces of the National People's Army to be able to master extremely complicated situations.

In view of the comprehensive and forceful rearmament measures by the NATO states and their constantly modernizing and equipping their armed forces with highly efficient weapons systems, we must more and more proceed from the consideration that the demands made on the reaction capability, steadfastness and striking power of our air defense will grow all the time, as the enemy needs less time to approach his targets and his tactical alternatives for breaking through our air defense system become more varied.

This also, objectively, creates the necessity for placing at the center of all our efforts the constant combat readiness of all our components, their incessant strengthening and improvement.

Technically improving all weapons system of air defense is one side of it. It proceeds with continuity and guarantees the application of modern systems which in their technical parameters and armaments are superior to the enemy's. More than ever, consideration should always be given to the fact that combat readiness is a complicated, manifold and dynamic process which must still be better understood in its entirety and must be reflected in concrete measures in everyday military action.

To raise our combat readiness means better and more effectively training our army personnel, preparing them all round for an even threatening enemy aggression.

To raise our combat readiness means a more and more perfect control over our combat technology in fully exploiting its combat potentials, more rapidly appropriating new and modern weapons systems, and reaching higher combat values.

To raise our combat readiness means above all training for all elements of combat still more systematically, with the difficult elements being of decisive importance.

A noticeable increase in our combat readiness is obtained by still better care and maintenance of our weapons and equipment. It has been proven that it is possible to extend the life of weapons, installations and equipment, with greater economy for higher combat values, while saving financial means.

What Distinguishes Socialist Armed Forces?

In all this, one can hardly overestimate the importance of the greater efforts that of necessity have to be undertaken by the commanders and staffs, effectively supported by the party organizations, for bolstering military discipline and order, for further shaping service and living conditions, and for developing socialist relationships among army personnel and the collectives.

Especially on those areas of our military activity must the decisive advantages of our socialist armed forces be brought to bear. A convincing class-related education of all army personnel and civilian employees, and steady, patient and consistent promotion of their initiative and creative forces and skills lead to the highest performances. Uniform requirements, precise orders and a consistent enforcement of them, a strict organization of military life, close contacts with the soldiers, mutual trust, firm and stable relations of class-comradeship between the superior officers and their subordinates as well as within the collectives, systematically improving service and living conditions, and an unconditional protection of the rights of every army member--those are important factors that more

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and more determine the fighting strength and combat readiness of all our troop components and units.

The staffs also have a great responsibility in applying scientific knowledge to all areas of military affairs.

We need new scientific knowledge and its consistent application--even partial knowledge--in areas so important for our combat readiness as, for example, a complete and perfect control of our combat technology.

It is gratifying that even during the first months of their training year the members of the Air Force and Air Defense Command reached good results in the direction toward improving our combat readiness. In them is reflected the experience, made a thousand times, that what ultimately decides the degree of combat readiness is the indefatigable personal dedication of all our army personnel and civilian employees. The impressive picture again reveals itself clearly: The higher the socialist consciousness among the army personnel, the greater their dedication to the solution of the military tasks, which are by no means simple, and the more active is their participation in socialist competition, which makes it possible for us to concentrate all the strength of our combat collectives on the improvement of our combat readiness.

Competition and Comradeship-in-Arms

As it was when we prepared the 25th anniversary of the founding of the GDR, so also in this last training year, army personnel and civilian employees were drawn into competition. Under the slogan "Soldiers Initiative 75--United With the Comrades in Arms--Strong for Battle and Combat Ready," thousandfold initiatives developed which through everyday military practice reflect the indestructible military alliance, mainly, with our Soviet class comrades, and which keep proving time and again that the experiences of the Soviet Army, our close collaboration with the Soviet troop components and units, and with the other fraternal armies, as well as the internationalist thought and deeds of our army personnel, constitute the most important source for steadily maintaining a high combat readiness. This also is fully confirmed by the anti-aircraft rocket unit G., which has since the start of the training year carried on its socialist competition on the basis of a joint program with a counterpart unit of the Soviet Army.

One day every month, both units sponsor jointly a day of comradeship-in-arms. Jointly the members of these units are deepening their Marxist-Leninist knowledge by organizing mutual visits and exchanging experiences with each other. The two youth organizations of the units are also working together very interestingly and effectively. They are supporting each other through club seminar meetings in gaining political knowledge, where they primarily deepen what they know about the revolutionary traditions of the German and international labor movement.

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Their joint measures are important guidelines for meeting their combat tasks. They serve making them perfect in the fulfillment of all tasks of the military service, in testing and exercises. They help the members of both units in obtaining good and very good results in test firing. Military comparisons are carried out to determine the best performances in operating launch ramps, in radar and firing performance. Mutual support for mastery in the use of ordnance and in its upkeep, maintenance and control has become standard procedure. In close collaboration and by exchanging their best experiences, both units are working on the implementation of innovator proposals that aim at significant improvements in their combat readiness.

Also in the spiritual-cultural sphere, their comradeship-in-arms becomes a personal experience for the members of both units. Joint film and book discussions, visits to memorials and monuments, and regular athletic competitions help solidify the fraternal relationships between the comrades-in-arms. As in this unit so everywhere in our Air Force and Air Defense Command is the fraternal combat alliance, above all with our Soviet class comrades, being made still more intimate at present. On this firm foundation the members of our Air Force and Air Defense Command make real the legacy from the fighters of the Great Patriotic War against imperialism and fascism. With internationalist responsibility, they are strengthening the military forces of socialism within the fraternal defense community of the Warsaw Pact, in order to make peace more secure and to create favorable conditions for the further development of socialism and communism and for the progress by the revolutionary world movement in its struggle against imperialism.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin: "Werke" (Works), Vol 28, Berlin, 1963, p 26.
2. Ibid., Vol 15, Berlin, 1963, p 187.
3. According to the ministers conference of the Eurogroup of 9 December 1974.

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DEPUTY NAVAL COMMANDER PRAISES BALTIC FLEETS

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German May 75 pp 98C-103C

[By Rear Admiral G. Kutzschebauch, deputy commander of the People's Navy]

/Text/ It is a well-known fact that the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Warsaw Pact is closely tied to the significant date of May 8, which is Liberation Day, as well as to the historically so important fact of the 30-year period of peace in Europe. The might of the Soviet Union, which has been demonstrated so impressively through its victory over fascism, and the strength of socialism which has been enhanced considerably as the result of the signing of the Warsaw Pact, constituted the prerequisite for an ever more effective carrying through of the policy of peaceful coexistence. Our socialist military coalition is the shield which not only protects the construction of socialism, but which also contributes to the bridling of imperialism, so that the initiated process of detente can be made irreversible. The practice of constantly calling this relationship between the growing all-round increase in the strength of socialism and the prevailing of the policy of peaceful coexistence to the attention of all members of the People's Navy must constitute a priority task in the sphere of politico-ideological work in the People's Navy. We must draw the proper conclusions for a necessary and continuous raising of the level of our combat readiness, and we must derive therefrom for each individual comrade his resultant personal obligations. The main concern in the sphere of awareness formation is, and will always continue to be, the presentment of the role played by the Soviet Union and its army and navy.

The coming into existence and the growth of the strength of the Soviet Navy, as well as its most recent history, lend themselves to providing a

vivid portrayal of the enormous changes which have taken place as regards the relationship of power in the world. Experience has shown that all members of the People's Navy have a special interest in the development, the tasks, and the life of the Soviet Navy. This provides useful starting points for clarification of basic ideological questions. These same considerations have also formed the basis for a thorough discussion of the development in the relationship of power on the high seas at a military-political People's Navy consultative meeting which took place on 11 March 1975 at Stralsund.¹

The Banner of the Soviet Navy on All Seas

As is well known, at the end of 1945 American imperialism had the most modern navy on the oceans of the world. Approximately 75 percent of all the ships of the U.S. Navy, particularly of those of the most important classes, were less than 5 years old. It was the view of the United States of America that its navy had to be the most important means of applying pressure for the purpose of pushing through its imperialist policy. The attack-plane carrier formations and the group of atomic submarines carrying nuclear weapons became an acute threat not only for the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community of states, but also for the progressive developments in the national states. The commander in chief of the Soviet Navy, Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Gorshkov, characterized this naval policy as follows: "It is difficult to find on our planet any area in which the leaders of the United States of America have not employed their favorite foreign-policy weapon--their navy--against the most progressive forces of the peoples of the most diverse nations."² It thus became clear that it was necessary to include the oceans in the worldwide struggle for a revolutionary change in the relationship of power. The imperialist naval powers therefore had to be confronted with forces capable of standing up to them.

The U.S. imperialists are still today stubbornly adhering to their objective of incessantly reinforcing their naval armament. The United States already have more than 50 percent of their strategic nuclear-weapon potential stationed at sea. This proportion is to be increased further and is to amount to approximately 75 percent in 1980.

Extraordinary efforts are also being made by the United States and the other NATO states for further development in the sphere of conventional armament. In this connection they are, above all, intent on achieving greater firing power and a higher destruction factor of their weapons coupled with a simultaneous reduction in personnel. All of these facts clearly show the extent of the extraordinary responsibility which our Soviet brothers-in-arms have taken on in order to keep this potential in check in such a manner that their naval formations are always ready to repulse an enemy attack at any time of day or night, no matter from where it may be launched.

Approximately 20 years ago, i.e. in the middle of the 1950's, the building up of a modern ocean-going navy was begun in line with a decision of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The top spot in the navy was accorded to the submarine and naval air forces equipped with nuclear rocketry. Thus, as has been stated by Army General J. Ivanovsky, our navy developed "into a fear-inspiring force.... Atomic submarines are a principal means for use in the solution of the most important tasks of the navy. They are capable of carrying out strikes from great distances against naval targets as well as against land targets along coastal areas and in the hinterland of the enemy."³ Thus, in addition to the strategic rocket troops, the navy became the most important means at the disposal of the high command for exerting a decisive influence on the course of fighting in the theaters of war.

The Soviet Navy pushed ahead into the vastnesses of the oceans with completely new under-water and surface ships and attained the capability to solve operational and strategic tasks in an armed conflict with a strong naval opponent. This development was closely connected with the development of entirely new tactics, operational skills, and the theory of making strategic use of such resources.

Overwhelmed by these harsh realities, former NATO general Count Kielmannsegg wrote as early as 1969: "The Soviet Navy is today sailing on all seven seas, is the second-strongest navy, in terms of the age of its ships is the youngest navy and, as regards its technical state and its composition, is the world's most offense-oriented navy."⁴

The Soviet Navy's flag is today waving in the vastnesses of the Atlantic Ocean and of the Pacific Ocean, in the tropical latitudes of the Indian Ocean, and in the rough Arctic areas.

Imperialism is today obliged to acknowledge the hard and unchangeable fact that the relationship of power on the high seas has in the course of 20 years undergone a fundamental change in favor of socialism. It was not in the last instance due to these realities that the United States was forced to sign a number of agreements with the Soviet Union. One of these agreements concerns the prevention of incidents on and over the oceans. Through this document there has not only been established a regulation which is in line with international law and which is intended to prevent naval accidents and conflicts but, through it, respect is also paid to the Soviet Union as a naval power and the presence of the Soviet Navy on all oceans is recognized.

Changes in the Baltic Sea Area

As is generally the case on our entire planet, the change in the power relationship between socialism and imperialism is also apparent in the area of the Baltic Sea.

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It is necessary and correct practice on our part if, in our politico-ideological work, we also effectively present and explain those developments in the land and sea areas which are particularly important to us in addition to the fundamental changes of global proportions. Of course, the members of the People's Navy recognize the fact that the northern part of Europe has not been excluded from the turbulent political developments which have taken place in the past 39 years. But a portion of them have only limited concepts of the course of this process and of how difficult and complicated this struggle was, and of what the achievements were through which today's realities were brought about. It is particularly these aspects which should be brought to the attention of the young sailors, midshipmen, officer candidates, and officers in a manner which is as clearly understandable as possible. This is so important particularly because our young comrades, while acquiring knowledge from the study of the experiences gained in the class struggle, are enabled to take up their own militant class-based positions and to get answers to many complicated current political questions.

For instance, it is one of today's self-evident, incontrovertible facts that socialism has been firmly established also along the coasts of the Baltic Sea, from Leningrad to Luebeck Bay. We must, however, explain again and again the fact that concealed behind this situation are the victory of the Soviet Union of the Great Patriotic War and the struggle of the workers in the People's Republic of Poland and in the German Democratic Republic for the construction and development of socialism and for the consolidation of our socialist military alliance. Having historic processes of this kind explained to us provides all of us with the optimism, confidence in victory, and strength which we, who participate in the shaping of these significant changes, need in our daily work, in our training, and in combat service.

Important prerequisites for the further consolidation of our fighting strength and combat readiness are the increasingly solidifying collaboration of the socialist Baltic fleets and the ever closer linking of the relations between the Baltic Red Banner Fleet, the Polish Navy, and the People's Navy.

During the past 20 years, there has been developed between the three socialist Baltic navies such a deep friendship that it is today considered to be entirely normal practice to carry out combat and operational-tactical training on the basis of standardized documents. It has also become a matter of course that in the course of exercises and maneuvers, depending on the particular situation and on the task to be carried out, the participating forces operate in mixed groupings and are led by the commanders and staffs of either the Baltic Red Flag Fleet, or the Polish Navy, or the People's Navy. In the lives of military personnel it is today generally accepted practice that questions and problems which arise from jointly

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carried-out work and which at times must be solved quickly are cleared up in an unbureaucratic and operational manner and without any large-scale action plans.

Of course, this development did not take place without its difficulties. This, however, is entirely normal. What is significant in this respect is the fact that, in this process, the three fraternal navies merged to become an effective socialist militant alliance. This alliance between our navies is firm and unshakeable. "The basis for their cooperation is formed by common ideology, loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, boundless devotion to the banner of proletarian internationalism, and the uniformity of the tasks to be carried out for the protection of the socialist achievements of the peoples of the fraternal states."⁵ It is these decisive factors which have always provided the necessary force and strength for our naval alliance. The governments of our three countries have always made available the necessary forces and means in order to make sure that each individual navy was enabled to carry out its specific tasks and to live up to mutual requirements. Combat-ready formations were created and trained in good time. There developed an appropriate organization of forces and their stationing, as well as an effective command system. This cooperation was steadily expanded and improved and a constantly high level of combat readiness was ensured.

The fraternal navies sailed a straight, uniform course from the modest beginnings of their cooperation in the course of their first joint naval exercise in 1957 to the latest joint exercises in the 1970's. Today one can therefore state with justification that the socialist Baltic fleets, in collaboration with the ground and air forces, have made their contribution to the realization of the historical mission of the military forces of socialism.

The Socialist Baltic Fleets Are Effective and Reliable

Whether it liked it or not, imperialism was obliged to take cognizance of the fact that the times of its unlimited rule and power have gone forever in the Baltic Sea area as well. The class enemy has been forced to put up with the fact that after World War II there have emerged in the Baltic Sea socialist naval forces which are today keeping a check on all actions and movements of the imperialist navies, alertly and in a state of combat readiness.

The wise and clear-sighted leadership of our fraternal parties is reflected in these facts. The deputy minister for national defense and chief of central staff has made the following statement: "Today more than ever before, imperialism is obliged to take into account the fact that any attempt to infringe upon the peaceful socialist and communist reconstruction work of our peoples and upon the freedom and independence of the fraternally

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united socialist countries will be given a decisive rebuff by the Soviet army and the Soviet navy and by the armies of our militant socialist community."6

It is today an undisputed fact that the three allied fraternal navies have in the past 20 years made a considerable contribution to the preservation of peace and security in the Baltic area. It would, however, be a huge error if we were to assume that our imperialist adversary, particularly the admiralty of the Bundesmarine /navy of the Federal Republic of Germany/ will acquiesce in this new situation. It is a matter of course that, under the pressure of the existing realities, the adversary adapts himself to the new conditions. His objective, however, will continue to be to bring about a change in his favor in the power relationship. It is for this purpose that efforts are being made to maintain and expand the continuing presence of NATO naval forces in the Baltic Sea, particularly in the area east of Bornholm. This conception is also in line with the demand made last year by retired Rear Admiral E. Wegener that "war ships of the West put in appearances in the Baltic Sea on a regular basis and with a certain degree of permanence...and that the Western powers make it their task to cruise frequently in the Soviet-controlled sea areas east of Bornholm!" Wegener demanded the permanent stationing of a destroyer squadron in the Baltic Sea and "the disposition of a land-based naval air squadron (which could be American) with tactical nuclear weapons."7

Such statements plainly mark the characteristic features of FRG imperialism and militarism. From this there results for us the necessity to increase our alertness further and to carry out our military service with the highest sense of duty and utilizing all of our physical and mental resources. By the same token we must not be neglectful of the fact that, in addition to the other NATO navies, the navy of the Federal Republic of Germany is presently effecting a very comprehensive modernization program which must be taken seriously. It is understandable that we in the People's Navy have drawn the necessary conclusions from this and that there result for us still many additional conclusions to be drawn for raising the level of our combat readiness and especially also for our politico-ideological work. The united socialist Baltic Sea fleets whose main force is the Baltic Red Banner Fleet have, as a component of the Warsaw Pact forces, been and are today a modern, effective, and dependable instrument for use in the protection of the socialist Baltic Sea coasts and territorial waters, as well as for preservation of peace in the Baltic area. This will continue to be so also in the future.

We can today, 30 years after the victory of the Soviet Army over Hitlerite fascism and two decades after the creation of the Warsaw Pact, confirm with satisfaction the fact that, as a member of the socialist Baltic Sea fleets, the People's Navy is a respected partner of the Baltic Red Banner Fleet and of the Polish Navy, and that it has always carried out its responsibilities in an honorable manner.

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The People's Navy's Honorable Contribution to the Alliance

Due to the clear-sighted military policy of our Marxist-Leninist party, the development of our People's Navy has always been characterized by the principles of proletarian internationalism and by the requirements of collective defense of socialist countries. Suffice it only to mention the systematic supply of ships and military technical equipment from Soviet and our own production as well as the continual development of the flotillas and the training installations of the People's Navy. And the solidification of socialist internationalism was served, above all, by jointly carried-out training measures, exercises, and fleet visits. It becomes obvious from these facts that the building up, the structure, the organizations, the armament, the equipment, and the training and education of the People's Navy have at all times fully met the requirements of the socialist comradeship in arms. We may conclude with justified pride that, since having become a member of the fighting alliance of the socialist Baltic Sea fleets, the People's Navy has always done justice to its growing tasks and to its international obligations, may that have been for the maintenance of some favorable operational procedure in the interest of all fraternal navies, or some combat-connected activity.

During the past years there have been more than a few situations testing the competence of the People's Navy, of the commanders and political workers, of the party and FDJ /Free German Youth/ organizations, and of the staffs, formations, troop units, and rear service units. We are fully justified in making the assessment that, thanks to the exemplary achievements of the sailors, noncommissioned officers, midshipmen, officers, admirals and civilian employees, the People's Navy has passed all tests of its competence and that it has at no time disappointed its comrades-in-arms. The achievements of our navy have repeatedly been evaluated highly by our comrades-in-arms such as, for instance, by the minister for national defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Gretchko; the commander in chief of the allied forces of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal of the Soviet Union I. I. Yakubovsky; and the commander in chief of the Soviet Navy, Fleet Admiral S. G. Gorshkov.

We consider such evaluation to be a high honor, and we regard it as an expression of appreciation of the efforts of all members of the People's Navy, but at the same time we also regard it as an obligation to master the growing tasks of this training year through new initiatives and actions within the framework of the competitive campaign "Soldiers' Initiative 75-- Together with Our Comrades-in-Arms, Strong and combat-ready!" At the same time we are looking forward towards the coming developmental phase of the Warsaw Pact and of the united socialist Baltic fleets.

In this connection we are in our ideological work striving to make all of our comrades increasingly aware of the responsibility of the socialist

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military forces, because from so doing there will result solid motives for taking action to increase our combat readiness and because thereby new forces are released for a further pushing through of peaceful coexistence and for the struggle to bring about the final defeat of imperialism. We will also in future strive to bring about a convincing unmasking of the aggressive nature of imperialism, which has not changed. Thus the enemy image, based on class considerations, is at the same time to be made even more distinctly apparent.

Finally, and particularly, the 20-year history of our alliance has taught us that it is necessary to increase further the effectiveness of the internationalist and patriotic education of the members of our People's Navy and of all of our fighting collectives. Efforts to strengthen confidence in the policy of the party of the workers' class and to expand further its leading role are inseparably connected with this endeavor.

Faithful to socialist internationalism, the German Democratic Republic will continue to contribute actively to the strengthening of the unity and solidarity of the socialist community of states, to the joint military protection of socialism and peace, and it will reinforce the close comradeship-in-arms between the National People's Army, the Soviet Army, and the other fraternal armies."⁸

That is our desire and our avowal on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Soviet Union's victory over fascism in the Great Patriotic War and on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the founding of our socialist defense coalition.

FOOTNOTES

1. Consultation of the commanders and political officers of the People's Navy on 11 March 1973 at Stralsund on the topic: "Twenty Years of Warsaw Pact--20 Years of Successful Military Policy of the Socialist Community of States."
2. Gorshkov, S. G.: MORSKOL SBORNIK (Moscow), Issue 12, p 4.
3. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (Berlin/A edition), 21 Feb 1975.
4. Kielmannsegg: "The Mediterranean in the Grip of the Powers (1)," DIE WELT (Hamburg), 7 June 1969.
5. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (Berlin/A edition), 22/23 Feb 1975.
6. Ibidem.
7. Quoted from: UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, Annapolis Issue 1, 1974.

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8. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (Berlin/A edition), 22/23 Feb 1975.

TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF TORPEDOS DESCRIBED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German May 75 pp 119C-123C

[By Commander P. Schubert, engineer]

/Text/ The torpedo is today still a highly important weapon. One proof of this is, among others, the construction and commissioning of new torpedo-carrying craft and the intensive further development of torpedos.

Torpedos have the capability of carrying to the enemy explosive charges weighing up to several hundred kiloponds, and they thus have a destructive effect. To be sure, torpedo-carrying craft can be counteracted more effectively through more highly developed radar technology, fully automatic artillery, guided and unguided rockets, helicopters, and the various acoustical systems used for defense against submarines. But the developments in the field of technology have, of course, not by-passed the torpedo either: the torpedo carriers have become faster, the aiming devices have been improved, the torpedos are capable of higher speeds, their explosive power has increased, they function more reliably, and the level of probability of hitting their targets has been raised considerably due to the development of new passively or actively functioning target-seeking systems or through pre-set guidance techniques.

The Need for Technical Information

During the period in which they are in use, torpedos are subjected to various technical inspections and types of repair work. In this connection, the individual mechanisms of the torpedos are checked with a view to their functioning and their meeting certain technical parameters.

The extensive mechanics and the intricacies of some of the technical processes call for comprehensive knowledge, skills, and many years of experience on the job on the part of shop personnel. It is at times very difficult to recognize the concrete cause for a technical failure. An example of this follows:

As a rule, conveyance of water for a steam-gas torpedo, the steam engine of which is driven by a hot air-steam mixture, is carried out by means of compressed air. The water, in turn, conveys the fuel. All the components get into the evaporator in which the fuel is ignited, the water is evaporated, and the air is heated. The temperature which develops in the course of this process and which depends on the proportion of the three components, to a considerable extent determines the pressure inside the evaporator. The interior pressure is directed against the feed pressure and affects the infusion proportion. This multiple reticulation makes adjusting the evaporators a very difficult task, since any change in the supply of one fuel component necessarily also influences the other components. In view of this process, causes of breakdowns can be determined only with difficulty. However, the performance of the torpedo engine and thus, in the last analysis, the torpedo speed depend on the adjustment of the evaporator--pressure regulator complex. If considerable divergence from the normal speed occurs, the probability of hitting the target is reduced and so is, of course, also the effectiveness of a torpedo attack.

Similar complicated situations also arise in the sphere of the guidance systems of the torpedos. In order to be fully conversant with the technical aspects of a torpedo, one must thoroughly evaluate all information concerning its condition, and that includes its behavior at the time of its being fired. It is precisely at the time when practical use is made of a torpedo that technical defects frequently become most readily apparent, and sometimes it is possible to detect symptoms already at the time when they are developing.

For practice launchings, torpedos are used which have an exercise head which is filled with water instead of an explosive-filled warhead. At the end of the distance to be traversed by the torpedo, the water is blown out by means of compressed air. The otherwise not floatable torpedo is thus given static buoyancy and can be recovered.

Evaluation of the Diagrams

In addition to the devices which are capable of indicating by day and by night the torpedo's location after it has come to the surface, there can also be installed in the exercise heads measuring devices which register the various data indicative of the torpedo's run, such as for example its speed, the depth at which it is traveling, and its roll. It is useful to

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install measuring devices in each training torpedo, regardless of the particular objective of a firing exercise, in order to obtain as comprehensive information as possible.

For recording depth and roll, in most instances an autographic recorder is used which records the static pressure of the water via a diaphragm and transmits this information to a spring-driven cylinder by means of a compound lever arrangement and a recording stylus. The roll is registered with the help of a pendulum. The amplitude of the pendulum swing is recorded on the same cylinder, in which connection the stroke of the pendulum of the described autographic recorder begins registering already at approximately 30 degrees. Figure 1 shows a measuring segment which depicts a normal torpedo run. All diagrams which are divergent from this normal form indicate irregularities in the travel of the torpedo and should therefore be considered to be cause for checking the torpedo aggregate concerned, even in cases when the tactical tasks were carried out anyway in connection with the firing of such a torpedo.




Figure 1. Autographic diagram for depth and roll (Normal Form)

To be sure, the difficulty consists in interpreting the irregularities. It is therefore particularly important to do the following:

- to collect appropriate data;
- to compare diagrams obtained under similar conditions;
- to also consider and evaluate information of "secondary importance";
- to carry out technical examinations in order to confirm the breakdown causes suspected on the basis of the diagrams;
- to reflect on the technical processes which might apply.

Figure 2 shows a roll diagram in connection with which it is to be noticed that the roll curve shows a clearly discernible asymmetry vis-a-vis the zero line. This asymmetry, which corresponds to a twisting of the torpedo

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around its longitudinal axis, gradually builds up at the beginning curve, then attains a constant value which is retained along the major part of the curve and which toward the end gradually disappears. It is therefore dependent on speed. If, through an appropriate examination, one eliminates the possibility of a defect in the measuring apparatus (for instance, by comparing diagrams prepared of various torpedos with the use of the same apparatus), or the very improbable possibility of a shifting of the torpedo mass, then the force which has caused the torpedo to be deflected from its intended path can only have been produced by an asymmetry of its flow resistance.




Figure 2. Diagram of autographic depth and roll recording (assymetry of roll)

Key: 1. Assymetry

Such assymetries, however, are in most instances caused by deformation of the stabilizer frames fitted to the rear part of the torpedo, and possibly also through faulty alignment of the vertical or horizontal rudders, which are generally divided. Such defects are not necessarily always detectable with the naked eye. If the fact that the assymetries in the roll diagram are caused by deformations of the stabilizer frames has been confirmed repeatedly in actual practice, one may on the basis of this manifestation again and again conclude with a high degree of probability that it is due to the same torpedo defect. Once the cause of a defect has been recognized, it can in most instances be eliminated quickly.

We will now observe in a further example the end portion of a diagram showing the torpedo's underwater travel. It may be seen from Figure 3 that at that part of the diagram at which the curve approaches the zero line (the torpedo head had already been blown out and the torpedo has reached the water surface at the end of its run), there is noticeable a sudden brief downward swing, i.e. a swing in the direction of greater water depth. An examination showed that several diagrams presented the same phenomenon. Interpretation of this sudden downward jump caused some difficulties. Finally it was determined that, in the piping which passes through the torpedo head's interior and which conducts water for measuring the static

pressure to the metering diaphragm from a lateral boring on the outside of the head, minor leakages occurred in instances of strong pressures. The pressures formed inside the head whenever the replacement valve began to operate. Air flows into the head via this valve in order to push out the ballast water at the end of the torpedo's run. Up until the moment when the spring tension of the blow-out valve is being overcome, there develops in the head for a short time an overpressure amounting to several kp/cm^2 , which has reached the diaphragm of the metering device due to the above-mentioned leakages in the tubing. The deflection of the metering device indicator thus was not caused by the static pressure of the water, which corresponds to whatever the depth is at which the torpedo is traveling, but it was produced by an unintended extraneous pressure as a result of the above-described defect in the exercise head.




Figure 3. Final phase of the under-water travel curve of an autographic diagram (extraneous pressure)

Key: 1. Deflection caused by extraneous pressure

This defect in the exercise head was recognized exclusively by evaluation of the diagrams, because the leakiness of the tubing did not become apparent in connection with the pressure tests stipulated in the delivery terms.

In a similar manner as in the above-described examples, it is possible to detect with the aid of such diagrams gear defects in the mechanisms and lever systems of the depth control devices (instability of the regulator; no settling down after the building-up phase; the curve reflecting the torpedo's under-water travel is not a straight line but a wavy line), maladjustment of the depth-controlling apparatus (too much tolerance as regards the depth at which the torpedo is to travel), as well as other defects.

Important information concerning the technical condition of torpedos can also be obtained through evaluation of speed diagrams. The rate of acceleration, constancy of speed, and the point of time at which the speed decreases at the end of the run permit the drawing of conclusions which can be of importance with respect to the repairs to be made. Thus, for instance, one can conclude from too quickly occurring acceleration, from

too high a velocity, and from premature inception of the speed reduction occurring at the end of the run, that the pressure regulator-evaporator complex is out of adjustment, i.e. that the rate of air flow is too high. Such information makes it possible to obtain concrete indications of how certain adjustment coefficients are to be changed within the framework of the repair work process.

The following example is intended to demonstrate from what seemingly unimportant information it is sometimes possible to obtain criteria for further investigations and findings:

For purposes of preventing freezing, the water chambers of torpedos are during the winter months filled with a mixture of water and methanol. In the course of a test, a check was to be carried out of the extent to which the combustion of this additional carbon-carrying agent affects the speed of the torpedo. When evaluating this test, it was first of all noticed that the rate of acceleration varied and that, in the case of some of the torpedos, it was several times that of others. In order to further clarify these observations, tests were carried out without the addition of methanol. It was found from these tests that the torpedos with increased speed showed divergencies also in some other parameters and that their pressure regulator-evaporator complexes were poorly adjusted. These torpedos had too high an air flow rate to begin with. From this resulted an excess of oxygen in the evaporator. The result of this fact was that, in those cases where "methanol shots" were given, the additional oxygen was to a considerable extent burned up, which increased the performance of the torpedo engine. In the majority of the well-adjusted torpedos, the oxygen proportion was balanced. Only a small quantity of the alcohol which had been added to the fuel mixture burned up and the performance increase was small.

The examples which we have offered are intended to show that it is absolutely necessary actually to make use of the available recording devices in connection with the firing of torpedos of any kind in order to obtain as much information about the torpedo's run as possible. They are intended to reinforce the conviction that, through thorough evaluation of metering diagrams, utilizable indications for detecting technical defects of torpedos can be obtained.

Some Causes of Torpedo Failures

Of course, the propulsion characteristics of a torpedo are not exclusively determined by its technical condition. An important influence on the travel of a torpedo is exerted by the control personnel. It depends on their ability, their skills, and especially their conscientiousness when carrying out their controls whether a good shot can be made with a technically perfect torpedo. It has in the past been possible to eliminate to a very far-reaching extent the causes of malfunction due to faulty servicing.

Thus, for instance, there are hardly any more malfunctions caused by failure to observe prescribed work procedures when testing or preparing for firing (tightening of the little head of the displacement valve, tightening of the venting screw of the depth-controlling apparatus, and so forth). For instance, in connection with technical test firings, a system of subsequently checking the most important mechanisms and work processes is applied. As a result, faulty servicing can be eliminated in spite of a higher number of launchings and tense work situations.

Instances of fouling are another cause of torpedo failures. In this connection one must above all always have a clear understanding of the fact that, when combined with the oxygen contained in the compressed air, oil, just like any other carbon-carrying agent, becomes explosive if it is sufficiently finely dispersed or if there is a sufficiently large surface. Application of too much oil to rotating parts and oil residues in air passages and valves can cause such explosions. It is for this reason that, in connection with tests to determine tightness, oil must not be used (soap suds instead). If, for instance, the tightness of the rear compartment at the gyroscope adjustment controls is checked with the use of oil, the latter will, in case of a leak, get into the interior of the rear compartment and to the gyroscope, which is situated below it. If the latter is then started up, the oil is atomized. If, for instance, the temperature of a magazine is higher than the ignition temperature of the air-oil mixture, an oil explosion, and consequently a torpedo failure, may occur.

In addition, strict attention must be paid to seeing to it that the prescribed filters are used when fuelling up. This is so important because each instance of fouling and each foreign body can impair the fuel feeding process and can lead to misfirings.

However, irregular fuel feeding also occurs when parts of destroyed rubber gaskets (for instance, of the back-pressure valve of the air chamber) are present in the air conduit system. This can be avoided by constantly checking the gaskets and replacing them in good time and by thoroughly blowing out the air conduits before installation of the gyroscope.

Recovery of Training Torpedos Is a Prerequisite for Technical Evaluation

The most important prerequisite for evaluation of torpedo firings is, of course, the recovery of the torpedo after it has been fired. Much attention must therefore be paid to its organization in the area where the training exercise is to take place.

Thus, for instance, it was possible to recover one torpedo only after a long period of searching for it and at a great distance from the spot where it had been assumed that it would arrive at the surface. It almost

happened that this torpedo was lost due to "a technical failure of unknown cause," although technically, as was determined subsequently, it had been operating perfectly.

When organizing operations in the training area, particular stress must therefore be placed on observation of the torpedo's run and the determination of its arrival point. If, in connection with the latter, one uses as one's point of departure the maximum distance to be traversed by the torpedo, and if one takes into consideration possible divergencies between the intended and the actual firing position and direction, as well as possibly occurring gyroscopic irregularities affecting the course of the torpedo, the actual point of its emergence may differ considerably from the assumed one. If the search then extends over a long time, winds and currents will have their additional effects, and a technically perfect torpedo might easily be lost.

These concluding examples are intended to make it clear once more that both the preparation of a torpedo for firing and the firing itself are complicated and complex tasks in the fulfillment of which the torpedo technicians in the workshops, the control units of the flotillas, and operational personnel must cooperate. Thus, everyone must have a clear understanding of the fact that, in the last analysis, success depends on the work of all these collectives. It is therefore necessary constantly to analyze one's own work.